Fires above La Paz : by Blair, David Nelson
Lehigh University
Lehigh Preserve
Theses and Dissertations
1985
Fires above La Paz :
David Nelson Blair
Lehigh University
Follow this and additional works at: https://preserve.lehigh.edu/etd
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by Lehigh Preserve. It has been accepted for inclusion in Theses and Dissertations by an
authorized administrator of Lehigh Preserve. For more information, please contact preserve@lehigh.edu.
Recommended Citation
Blair, David Nelson, "Fires above La Paz :" (1985). Theses and Dissertations. 4543.
https://preserve.lehigh.edu/etd/4543
I 
FIRES ABOVE LA PAZ 
A CASE STUDY OF PRESS INFLUENCE ON FOREIGN POLICY 
by 
David Nelson Blair 
A Thesis 
Presented to the Graduate Committee 
of Lehigh University 
in Candidacy for the Degree of 
Master of Arts 
in 
the1Department of History 
I 
Lehigh University 
1985 
' ) " 
_ _) 
< 
This thesis is accepted and approved in partial 
fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of 
Arts. 
, /1J If fs 
l 
/ Professor in 
,) 
\,. 
... 
Chairman of Departmen, 
• • 11 
For James Raymond Blair, 
my brother in every sense of the word. 
.,..-,. 
' 
_) 
• • • 111 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Abstract 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 1 
Introduction 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 3 
I• A Thesis for Influence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ~ . . . . 5 
II. The MNR, Its Image and Relations 1941-1953 
• ••• 
20 
III. Communication through the Press • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 41 
IV. Relations with Sources 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 64 
v. Executives and the Press 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 86 
VI. Conclusions 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 106 
Bibliography 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 111 
Vita 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 116 
• 
• lV 
\ 
ABSTRACT 
In Fires Above La Paz: A. Case study of Press Influence 
on Foreign Policy, David Nelson Blair examines avenues of 
press influence on the relationships of the United States 
with other nations. Specificaliy, the study tests a thesis 
for such influence put forth by·James Reston of the New 
York Times in 1966. Reston contended that influence was 
weak and that what influence was present was not exerted 
along the lines of traditional theory. That theory held 
that an independent press produced informed citizens who 
then exercisd influence on an accountable government. 
Instead, Reston believed the press had its impact more 
directly through academic, congressional, and diplomatic 
circles. 
Blair examines Reston's thesis through a casec study of 
' 
press influence on relations between the United States and 
' 
Bolivia over a thirteen-year period, focusing on the 
Eisenhower administration and the revolutionary Bolivian 
~ 
governments that took office in 1943 and 1952. He examines 
articles from four major publications and the wri~ings of 
the government officials involved in the diplomacy. 
The study generally supports Reston's thesis, 
particularly in connection with communications betwee~--
1 
governments through the press and relationships between 
reporters and diplomatic sources. It denies that a 
relationship between th.e press and congressional sources 
can be universally applied and finds that Reston's thesis 
accounts only for short-term influence that is exercised in 
the District of Columbia. The study finds no evidence to 
support significant influence through academic circles. 
Finally, it supports Reston's claim that press influence in 
the·"·generation before 1966 was limited. 
\ 
,, 
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INTRODUCTION 
"If newspapers ... are to be charged with the duty of 
translating the whole public life of mankind, so that every 
adult can arrive at an opinion on every moot topic, they 
are bound to fail, in any future one can conceive they will 
continue to fail." 
The words were those of a 33-year-old journalist named 
Walter Lippmann. In Public Opinion, published in 1922, 
Lippmann described the workings of newspapers in a 
practical world far removed from traditional Western 
concepts. The work influenced a massive body of literature 
by social scientists and journalists that followed in the 
next six decades. One important work was The Artillery of 
the Press: Its Influence on American Foreign Policy, a 1966 
examination of media impact by James Reston. 
Reston described powers, problems and challenges of the 
press. In doing so, he provided an informal but detailed 
. 
thesis of press influence as it applied to United States 
foreign policy. The distinguishing feature of the book is 
· that it applied to a specific area; most other works were 
.,---.. 
\ 
theoretical and vague. That area, furthermore, involved an 
I 
I 
important feature of all but the sm~llest of American daily 
3 
?-
.. 
newspapers -- the coverage of United States relations with 
other nations. 
When Dwight Eisenhower took office in 1953, he sought 
stability through his foreign policy. He had no love for 
revolutionary governments. His administration placed a 
heavy emphasis on resisting any advancement o~ communism. 
The Bolivian government he faced posed problems. The 
president of the ruling Movimiento Nacionalista 
Revolucionario (MNR) had been supported by communists in a 
1951 election. Long-standing charges of Nazi ties had been 
leveled against the party. It had used force in 1952 to 
overthrow a government that had enjoyed generally good 
relations with the United States. 
Yet, by the end of the decade, more than a $100 million 
in aid from the United States had helped Bolivia's MNR 
governments to provide the greatest stability the country 
had seen since its economic and military disasters of the 
1930s. This study will test Reston's thesis by examining 
the role of the press in the formation of relations between 
the United States and the MNR over thirteen years --
concluding with-1953 and the extraordinary decision of a 
Republican administration to fully back revolutionaries in 
South America. 
4 
CHAPTER I. A THESIS FOR INFLUENCE 
Traditional media theory argues that in a free, 
democratic society, the exchange of information contributes 
to the running of a nation and its parts as a check on 
government through an educated electorate. The media have 
an impact by informing the voters who in turn exercise 
their influence through the ballot box. Theodore Peterson, 
a mass communications specialist at the University of 
Illinois, described two variations of this theory, 
libertarian theory and social responsibility theory, which 
he applied to Britain and the United States after 1688 and 
to the United States after 1900 respectively. They differ 
in the range of protection the press offers the public, but 
a principal task of the press under both theories is the 
"enlightening the public so as to make it capable of 
' 1 
self-government." 
DIRECT AVENUES OF INFLUENCE 
New York Times columnist James Reston took a different 
approach, arguing that actual media influence is exercised 
much less directly. Instead of operating_tqrough a mass 
1Fred Siebert, Theodore Paterson, Wilbur Schramm, Four 
Theories of the Press (Urbana: 1963), 74, 91. 
5 
. 
audience, he said in 1966, press influence flows through a 
much smaller group of people. 2 
This concept did not originate with Reston. In 1922, 
Walter Lippmann wrote: "Press problems are confused because 
critics expect the press to realize the fiction that each 
citizen must acquire a competent knowledge on every public 
issue." Joseph T. Klapper, a sociologist for the Columbia 
Broadcasting System, noted in 1960 that influential people 
in given fields are more likely than others to read press 
articles in those fields. Three years later, Bernard c. 
Cohen, a University of Wisconsin political scientist, 
applied the theme specifically to foreign coverage. One of 
approximately fifty journalists he interviewed said, "You 
should go on the assumption that only 10 percent of the 
best-informed people in the country are going to read 
foreign affairs anyway, and do your writing for them." 
Cohen cited other material suggesting that only about seven 
percent of newspaper readers are careful readers of 
international news. 3 
2James Reston, The Artiller of the Press: Its Influence 
on American Foreign Policy (New York and Evanston: 1967, 
63-76; more general works on media influence include Joseph 
Klapper, The Effects of Mass Communication (Glencoe, Ill: 
1960), and Sidney Krause and Dennis Davis, The Effecbs of 
Mass Communication on Poli ti cal Behavior ( University:· Park,,. 
Pa.: 1976) • 
3walter Lippmann, Public Opiniqn (New York: 1922), 31; 
Klapper, Effects, 38-43; Bernard c. Cohen, The Press and 
Foreign Policy (Princeton: 1963), 109, 251-57. 
6 
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Reston, however, presented a thesis that is useful in 
describing the nature of press influence i~ Unitied States 
foreign policy. He argued that the power of the press is 
overrated and that its influence is exercised primarily on 
three groups: (1) the Congress, {2) foreign embassies and 
the foreign press in Washington, and (3) universities. 
Reston stressed that the greatest media influence comes 
through a cooperative rather than an adversary 
relationship. Cooperation exists, according to Reston, 
between the press and many officials inc~uding congressmen 
and foreign diplomats outside the administration. Influence 
is exercisQd on these officials in two ways. First, the 
officials gain much of their information on government 
through media reports on its activities. Second, officials 
and reporters exchange information, each providing the 
other with a valuable service. (While influence flows in 
both directions, this inquiry will be concerned ~nly with 
press influence on government.) 
Congressmen and journalists are often natural allies, 
Reston said. Administration programs need congressional 
1 
funding, so congressmen can be a good source of executive 
branch news for reporters. Officials seeking money for a 
specific foreign aid measure, for example, must provide the 
Congress with enough information to justify the prpgram. 
Some of that information will be passed along to the press. 
7 
Likewise, congressmen view the administration in part 
through the press. 
Reston provided an example involving Arthur Vandenberg, 
chairman df the Senate Foreign Relatipns Committee. The 
senator originally opposed a $20 billion European recovery 
plan proposed by the Truman adminstration. He changed his 
position following months of front-page stories explaining 
the plan and ·reporting public support. Vandenberg 
ultimately led the effort to get the Marshal Plan through 
the Senate. 
Opposition congressmen, like reporters, watch for 
executive branch mistakes to criticize. Congressmen are 
sensitive to topics that are well covered by the press or 
that they expect will be well covered by the press. Thus 
military needs may get greater congressional attention than 
foreign aid. Congressmen rely on press exposure to ·maintain 
their public images in the face of elections they must win 
to hold their seats. The media often focus on the 
spectacular, so careful, analytical speeches may be played 
down. Moderate tones may leave a congressman unnoticed. The 
press may therefore inspire members of the House and 
. 
Senate, particularly new members attempting to establish 
themselves, to spout what Reston called •spectacular 
trivialities." 
Douglas Cater, Washington correspondent for the 
Reporter, backed Reston's agruments concerning the Congress 
8 
•· 
with examples from the Truman and Eisenhower years. Richard 
Nixon, according to Cater, climbed from a freshman 
congressman to vice president, not through association with 
any major programs, but through his part in the exposure of 
Alger Hiss. A routine incident involving Sen. Clifford P. 
Case demonstrates the effect that media procedures have on 
members of Congress. An aide to the senator, then a 
freshman, stationed himself by the Associated Press 
teletype in the Senate lobby. When an expected bulletin 
arrived announcing a presidential veto, the aide literally 
ran to the Senate press gallery a floor above. Case and his 
aide hoped that if Case reacted to the veto first, his 
opinions would be prominently displayed in afternoon 
newspapers. They were. 4 
Susan Heilmann Miller, a Stanford Ph.D. and working 
journalist, provided further support for a positive 
reporter-congressman relationship, which she called "living 
in symbiosis." She described the sharing of information 
between Rep. Fortney Stark and Jack Nelson, chief of the 
Washington Bureau of the Los Angeles Times. The two 
coordinated an effort to bring maltreatment of American 
prisoners in Mexican jails to the attention of other 
congressmen, the public and the State Department. 
4nouglas Catei, The Fourth Branch of Government (Boston: 1959), 52-53, 66. 
9 
Ultimately the Mexican government improved conditions out 
f f ·t . 5 o concern or 1 s image. 
Finally, Doris Graber, a University of Illinois 
political scientist, described influence by mutual 
cooperation between press and Congress but did so at the 
more routine level. Congressmen, she ar_gued, work with the 
media in their districts for pet projects and fund-raising. 
They hope reporting of their statements and positions will 
get the attention of lobby groups, not just the general 
public. Graber, however, described the relationship between 
Congress and the press as a love-hate relationship. 6 
Diplomats, 1 ike congressmen, excha!1ge information with 
reporters, according to Reston. Journalists are not usually 
experts, and they depend on other people's ideas. Experts 
in embassies give information and opinions to reporters who 
write the stories. Reporters, in turn, ask the 
administration questions based on those stories. Material 
from published stories and directly from reporters travels 
through diplomats and foreign journalists and affects 
intellectuals and foreign offices throughout the world. 
Both Reston and Cater cited an example of this process out 
of control. In a November 1950 news conference, President 
5susan Heilmann Miller, "Reporters and·congressmen: 
Living in Symbiosis,• Media Power in Politics, ed. Doris A. 
Graber (Washington: 1984), 274-281. 
6Doris A. Graber, Mass Media and American Politics 
(Washington: 1980), 212, 213-214. 
10 
Harry Truman read a statement stressing American intentions 
to stand firm in the face of direct Chinese intervention in 
the Korean War. During questioning, a reporter asked the 
president if the United States planned to use the atomic 
bomb. Truman replied that use of the weapon was "always 
under consideration• during emergencies. News accounts of 
the press conference led with ab.,"~tatement, and "always" 
was dropped from headlines, leav1 
__ only that A-bomb use 
was "under consideration." The repercussions included an 
immediate visit to Washington by British Prime Minister 
Clement Attlee for consultations on the matter. 7 
Graber detailed an extraordinary example of diplomatic 
signaling through the media. In 1938, the Times of London 
editorialized that Czechoslovakia "might be wise in her own 
interests to let the Sudeten-German areas go." Many in 
Europe considered the Times an official voice of the 
government, and some British historians contended that the 
editorial contributed more than any other factor to the 
German annexation of Czechoslovakia. Graber noted, however, 
that the contention is impossible to prove. 8 
Barry Rubin, a Washington-based historian and free-lance 
' journalist, agreed that foreign diplomats are affected by 
press reporting of signals from the United States 
7Reston, Artillery, 33; Cater, Branch, 37; Reston gives 
the more d~tailed account. 
8Graber1 Media, 13. 
11 
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government, as well as by reporting of foreign policy and 
American public opinion developments. 9 
Reston said little about media influence through 
universities. He wrote only that American universities 
"ironically, have a kind of intellectual contempt for the 
press, but read it more avidly, more critically, and 
probably more accurately than we read it ourselves." 
LIMITS OF INFLUENCE 
Reston felt the press had little influence on the 
executive branch. The White House, the State Department and 
the Defense Department look upon journalists with polite 
suspicion, Reston said. The public will take the word of 
the government over the word of the press, particularly in 
/ 
foreign affairs. Reston said, for example, that in 1963 and 
1964 the public tended to believe top government officials 
over the press on matters concerning involvement in 
Vietnam. Also, editorials reach relatively small audiences, 
and their influence is not transmitted to the executive 
through public pressure. Finally, according to Reston, the 
public usually has less strong opinions in foreign policy 
matters than in domestic matters, and in the former, 
presidents therefore have a freer hand •. 
Reston argued influence on the executive branch was 
· 
9sarry Rubin, •rnternational News and the Am~rican 
Media,• The Washington Papers (Beverly Hills and London: 
1977), 16. 
12 
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particularly low during the Eisenhower administration. 
Presidents John Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson followed the 
press closely, but Reston said, "President Eisenhower was 
irritated by the press and did not read it carefully." 
Others in the administration would be expected to follow 
suit because presidents, according to Reston, set the 
pattern for other members of the administr3tion. 
Reston, however, did recognize some press influence on 
the administration. The executive branch may be more 
sensitive to topics well covered by the media. In the 
1960s, for example, Washington ordered efforts to minimize 
civilian casualties in Vietnam following press reports of 
careless use of artillery fire and air powero 
Others also found press influence on American 
administrations -- thus challenging Reston's conclusions. 
Rubin included readers in the State Department among those 
who found press coverage of foreign affairs useful, arguing 
that officials often get better information up to a day 
sooner throught the press than they do through official 
channels. In fact, he wrote that officials throughout the 
executive branch use the media to keep up with the 
f 
developments of other agencies. Cohen noted that Secretary 
of State John Foster Dulles encouraged groups of 
13 
correspondents to hold private background dinners for State 
Department officials. 10 
Cater described an intense relationship between the 
president and the press. A reporter, for example, can gain 
a great deal of attention for the opinions of an obscure 
congressman by asking ·the president to react to them at a 
press conference. Reporters may even occasionally solicit 
presidential commitments through questioning. For example, 
during an exchange between President Eisenhower and Roland 
Evans, Jr., at a July 1957 press conference, the president 
opposed a suggestion which, it turned out, was contained in 
a section of the administration's proposed civil rights 
bii1. The section never became law. 11 
Did Reston underestimate the influence of the media 
through the administration? Despite his insistence that 
influence on the administraton was weak, he spent a sreat 
deal of.time talking about the presidency. He presented his 
ideas at a time when he worried that President Johnson was 
exercising increasingly unrestrained power in foreign 
policy by escalating the war in Vietnam. Graber, who 
believed the media enjoys extraordinary influence with the 
president, believed that press reports from the Dominican.,· 
Republic in 1965 spurred President Johnson to send troops. 
10Rubin, •News•, 16; Cohen, Press, 29. 
11cater, Branch, 29-30. 
14 
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She also causally linked the 1968 "Hunger in America" 
television documentary to changes in the federal food-stamp 
program, even though the broadcast was attacked by the 
secretary of agriculture. Graber believed that the 
president gets foreign affairs information through the 
\ 
press faster than through the State Department and that the 
press largely forms the presidents opinions as to what 
concerns of the country. 12 
Nonetheless, Reston stands by his argument, particularly 
in the context of the Eisenhower presidency. In 1985, he 
wrote, "I do thir1k the argument I made in The Artillery of 
the Press did apply to the Eisenhower administration 
perhaps more than most because he (President Eisenhower) 
was so popular that, like (President Ronald) Reagan, he 
d • t · ·t· • nl3 seerne immune o cr1 1c1sm. 
METHOD OF STUDY 
This paper will evaluate Reston's thesis for media 
influence on United States foreign PQ!icy through a study 
'-
~" 
of the relationship between Bolivia a~a the United States. 
It will fricus on the first two governments headed by or 
including members of the MNR in La Paz and the Eisenhower 
Administration in Washington. The time period studied 
extends from early 1941, when the MNR was formed, until the 
12Graber., Media, 194, 197, 258. 
-
13James Reston, letter to author, 30 Jan. 1985. 
15 
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1, end of 1953, by which time Presidents Dwight Eisenhower and 
Victor Paz Estenssoro had established the cooperative 
relationship which lasted until 1964. 
The origin of that relationship provides a good test of 
Reston's thesis under circumstances which were, at least 
from the point of view of the American press, more routine 
* than extraordinary. The MNR allegedly had ties with two 
American enemies of the era, nazisrn and communism, so good 
relations could not be taken for grant~J. Because the MNR's 
image could be a factor in its relations with the United 
States, American news organizations had a particularly good 
opportunity to exercise influence. Also, because the MNR 
was out of power during part of the period studied, there 
exists the opportunity to test the press as a means of 
communication where official means did not exist. 
Furthermore, the existence of memoirs by a major MNR 
figure, Ambassador Victor Andrade, adds to the potential 
depth of the study. Finally, because the MNR was an 
important political force in Bolivia for more than a decade 
prior to the ~ecisive year 1953, there exists the potential 
·~ to examine long-term influencP of the press. On the 
negative side, the United States Congress was not deeply 
involved in relations with· a;olivia in this period. It did 
participate to some degree, however, and this provides an 
opportun~ty to support conclusions. 
This study examines four major publications -- the New 
16 
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York Times, Time magazine, the Los Angeles Times and the 
Wall Street Journal. The New York Times is included because 
it is the most influential American newspapers in foreign 
affairs. Stories for review were selected by means of the 
newspaper's extensive index, making it possible to research 
the entire period studied. Time represented weekly news 
publications in the study. Time is also indexed, allowing 
. 
another comprehensive review of the period. 
The Los Angeles Times represented newspapers which might 
give greater attention to Latin American affairs because of 
the makeup of their readers. Los Angeles readers live near 
Mexico, and Latin American influences in their region are 
prominent. _Because the Bolivian situation involved price 
negotiations and the nationalization of a major industry, 
the Wall Street Journal is included to repre~ent financial 
journals. Neither the Los Angeles Times nor the Wall Street 
Journal is indexed for the period studied. Stories were 
located by scanning sections where foreign news typically 
appeared. Bec~use of the period studied covers thirteen 
years, examination was necessarily restricted to periods 
surrounding the most important events in the history of 
relations between La Paz and Washington. 14 
14Los Angeles Times and Wall Street Journal issues for 
the following periods were examined: 21-31 Dec. 1943; 6-10 
May 1951; 10-13 April, ·1-3 June, 1 Oct.-5 Nov. and 15-17 
Nov. 1952; 23 June-10 July and 22 Nov. 1953; all other 
issues of the Wall Street Journal from 1 April-10 Nov. 1952 
were also examined. 
17 
so 
Two other news organizations appear in the study, the 
Associated Press and the United Press. The three dailies 
all used copy from both wire services in coverage of 
Bolivian affairs. The Los Angeles Times and the Wall street 
Journal, in fact, relied entirely on the wire services for 
pertinent dispatches originating outside the United States 
and for all but a few pertinent dispatches from within the 
country. Examination of wire service copy, however, was 
limited to edited versions that appeared in the dailies 
studied. The International News Service, the third American 
wire service operating during the study period, was not 
carried by any of the three dailies. 
The stories in these publications were examined for 
signs of interaction between members of the press and 
sources in the executive branches, the diplomatic corps and 
the United States Congress. Specifically, stories were 
checked for reaction from congressmen to administration 
actions, attempts by congressmen to gain publicity through 
immoderate·statements, and use of numerous named or unnamed 
congressional sources. Diplomatic stories were checked for 
statements attributed to unnamed administration sources 
which instruct the Bolivian government as to administration 
thinking and for signs of contact between reporters and 
diplomats. These might appear in the form of named or 
unnamed diplomatic sources and expert questioning of 
government officials by reporters. Finally, stories were 
checked for executive branch reaction to stories and 
editorials and use of administration sources. For Reston's 
thesis to stand, executive branch sources and reaction 
should appear with far less frequency than the other types 
of material sources. 
Reston's thesis gives no detailed explanation as to how 
the press affects policy through the academic world and no 
other writer treats the subject. Nonetheless, Milton 
' Eisenhower's influential trip to Bolivia in 1953 suggests 
Reston's claim has merit •. This paper will examine that 
influence. 
To supplement the news stories examined, the study 
examines the available writings of victor Andrade and 
Eisenhower administration officials who were involved in 
relations between the United States and Bolivia. These 
provide insight into the attitudes of leaders toward the 
press and are superior to the news articles in determining 
the long-term impact of the press. 
19 
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CHAPTER II. THE MNR, ITS IMAGE AND RELATIONS 1941-1953 
·The Chaco War made the Revolution of 1952 inevitable,• 
wrote economist Robert J. Alexander. Indeed, in the 1930s 
Bolivia endured a useless and bloody war with Paraguay 
while the country still suffered the effects of a world 
depression. Toward the end of the decade, a discontented 
group of young, middle-class politicians began developing 
ideas for social, economic and political reforms. Born 
between 1904 and 1915, most had studied at the University 
of San Andres in La Paz and had developed nationalist 
ideas and vaguely socialist programs. On January 25, 1941, 
eight lawyers, three journalists, and an engineer founded 
the Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario and chose 
Victor Paz Estenssoro as their leader. 1 
In its first year, the MNR took pro-fascist positions in 
foreign policy debates. An early platform, for example, 
called "maneuvers of Judaism• anti-national and sought "the 
absolute prohibition of immigration, Jewish and of any 
1Robert Alexander, The Bolivian National Revolution (New Brunswick, N.J.: 19\8), 22; for a detailed account of the Chaco War, see David Zook, Jr., Conduct of the Chaco War (New Haven: 1960); for biographical information on major MNR figures, see James Dunkerley, Rebellion in the· Veins: Political Struggle in Bolivia 1952-82 (London: 1984), 
· 40-44, 54-55, and Christopher Mitchell, The Leyac~ of~ Populism in Bolivia (New York and London: 1977, 17-19. 
20 
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other sort which is unproductive." Bolivia had accepted 
Jews fleeing from Germany, but these immigrants competed 
for employment in La Paz instead of settling eastern 
Bolivia as anticipated. MNR members Carlos Montenegro and 
Augusto Cespedes had previously run La Calle, which 
published German fascist propaganda and had been openly 
anti-semitic. A promin~nt target of La Calle had been 
Mauricio Hochschild, a Jew who owned the second-largest 
tin-mining operation in Bolivia, and thus the MNR's 
reputation as anti-semitic grew further. In July, Paz 
Estenssoro -- then a deputy in the congress who had served 
briefly in the national cabinet a month earlier -- was 
arrested (and quickly freed) in connection with an alleged 
plot to import Nazi propaganda. Pragmatists in the party, 
however, felt the United States should not be alienated, 
and after January 1942, when Bolivia broke relations with 
Germany, no MNR member associated further with Germany. 
Instead the party focused on national matters and became 
pro-labor. 2 
2The MNR's early fascist and anti-semitic leanings are 
described by Alexander, Revolution, 30, and by Herbert 
Klein, Bolivia: Evolution of a Multi-Ethnic Society (New 
York: 1982), 202; Cole Blasier goes the furthest in 
distancing the MNR from German connections, arguing that 
any chance for significant Nazi support in the country 
ended with the suicide of President Germ&n Busch in 1939; 
see Cole Blasier, "The United States, Germany, and the 
Bolivian Revolutionaries (1941-1946)," Hispanic American 
Historical Review 52 (Feb. 1972), 26-54. 
21 
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THE VILLARROEL GOVERNMENT 
In the closing days of 1943, the MNR supported a 
revolution by Razon de Patria (The Nation's Cause), 
usually identi~ied only as RADEPA. It had begun as a secret 
lodge among army officers in a Paraguayan prisoner-of-war 
camp. After the war, members had admired the military 
dictatorships of David Toro and German Busch, who had 
presided over periods-of reform and party reconstruction. 
In 1940, however, the presidency had passed to a civilian, 
Enrique Penaranda, who, after gaining early support from 
emerging parties including the MNR, had drawn much 
criticism because of policies favoring a traditional 
economic system. This allowed profits of the large tin 
mines to be invested abroad at the expense Bolivian workers 
and the development of the country. Penaranda was also 
weakened by labor unrest which climaxed in the massacre of 
hundreds of miners and their families in Catavi in December 
1942. On December 20, 1943, Razon de Patria seized control 
of important regiments in La Paz, and MNR members took 
. 
control of the capital's telephone system to confuse 
Penaranda's defenses. _The coup succeeded quickly. 
Gualberto Villarroel, virtually unknown to that point, took 
the presidency, and Paz Estensorro, Montenegro and 
Cespedes gained cabinet postions. 3 
""""-· 
3The relationship betweeri Raz6n de Patria and the MNR 
22 
Pefiaranda, however, had enjoyed strong ties with the 
United states, and while Washington did not intervene to 
prevent or reverse the coup, it led most other nations in 
the hemisphere in denying recognition to Villarroel's 
government on the grounds that it had ties with the Axis 
through Argentina. In the months that followed, pressure 
from the United states ultimately led to the dismissal of 
the three MNR ministers before recognition was ultimately 
granted in June 1944. The MNR, however, returned to the 
4 
cabinet by the end of the year. 
The new government increased taxes on tin and allowed 
labor to become stronger. Feudal service was abolished and 
a national Indian conference was held for the first time. 
An education code was introduced, new rural schools were 
built, and a literacy campaign was launched. Villarroel, 
however, used excessive force during his thirty-one months 
in power. Opposition leaders were assassinated in 1944, a 
departure from the traditional use of exile, and their 
followers were jailed. Despite the government's vocal 
support of the Allies, charges of ties to nazism continued 
even after the German defeat in 1945. on July 14, 1946, a 
civilian march during a teachers strike turned violent. 
is described by Mitchell, Lesacy, 221 for a description of 
the Pefiaranda administration, see Klein, Bolivia, 216-18. 
-
4cole Blasier, The Hoverin Giant: u.s. Res onses to 
---~-=--i:--=--~~_...,.---~~~~~ ...... ~~..,..~ 
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Villarroel died in a mob attack on the presidential palace 
and the survivors of his government, including Paz 
Estenssoro, fled into the six years of exile that would 
later be known as the sexenio. 5 
The formation of political parties in Bolivia was not 
covered by the American press. _No news organization 
studied, for example, mentioned the formation of the MNR in 
the days following its birth. The alleged plot to smuggle 
German propaganda into Bolivia in July 1941 did give 
Victor Paz Estenssoro and his party prominent mention in 
American newspapers and magazines for the first time. The 
event was presented as war news, however, and as such was 
not followed up for its own sake after the initial 
t . 6 s ories. 
The Villarroel coup again brought Bolivia to American 
front pages. Reporters apparently found information on Paz 
Estessoro much easier to come by than that on Villarroel, 
and the former was treated as the power behind the 
' revolution even though the MNR had participated as a junior 
partner. For example, in Time's December 27, 1943, article, 
its first on the revolution, Villarroel is not mentioned. 
5The Villarroel years are described by Klein, Bolivia, 
217-20; reformist features of the government are described 
in Blasier, Giant, 34-35. 
6New York Times, 20 July 1941, l; Time, 28 July 1941, 
27; the earliest mention of "Victor Paz• uncovered in this 
study appears in a list of new cabinet ministers carried in 
the New York Times, 14 June 1941, 3. 
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Furthermore, the eve~ts continued to be viewed in the 
• 
context of the world war. The popular press was not alone 
in taking this view; journals such as Foreign Affairs did 
the same -- as did the United States State Department. The 
alleged ties of the new government to the Axis were of 
paramount importance to Americans. 7 
Coverage of the revolution evolved into coverage of the 
recognition question. Most American journalists not based 
in Bolivia apparently left the country shortly after the 
coup, however, and the news organizations they served 
gradually lost interest in the recognition question as it 
dragged on for six months. Even the New York Times relied 
on wire services for reports from the Bolivian capital 
after the nation settled down. When recognition came, it 
was not reported prominently, and American news 
organizations continued to rely on the Associat~d Press and 
United Press for dispatches originating in Bolivia for the 
remainder of the Villarroel years. This practice, in fact, 
was the norm throughout the period studied. Other 
correspondents were rarely in Bolivia except during crises. 
Time, for example, carried only three stories on Bolivia in 
7nuring the war, much of the literature on Latin America 
dwelled on German influence on the continent. See, for 
example, Percy Bidwell, "Good Neighbors in the War, and 
After,• Foreign Affairs 21 (April,1943), 524-34; John 
Campbell, "Nationalism and Regionalism in South America,• 
Foreign Affairs 21 (October 1942), 131-48; and Fernando de 
los Rios, •south American Perplexities,• Foreign Affairs 20 
(July 1942), 650-62. 
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1948, two inconsequential ancedotes and a report on the 
opening of a rail link with Brazil. Editorials and 
commentary were rare, and when they did appear, they were 
usually based on incomplete facts or understanding. Dr. 
Adamantios T. Polyzoides, a Los Angeles jouralist and 
foreign affairs commentator, demonstrated a working 
knowledge of the Bolivian situation in a column published 
the day after Villarroel took power, but he admitted that 
his facts were incomplete, and he did not follow up within 
the period studied. 8 
THE SEXENIO 
The MNR and remnants of Razon de Patria parted company 
in exile, and Paz Estenssoro's party worked to separate 
itself from the violent reputation of the lodge. It did not 
try to distance itself from Villarroel, however, and 
encouraged the view that the dead president had been a 
popular hero. The mythology of his martyrdom for the people 
became a significant force. In Bolivia, meanwhile, new 
leaders successfully worked to broaden the support of the 
MNR. Hernan Siles Zuazo built strong support in the middle 
class by advocating a program of economic stabilization and 
economic nationalism. Juan Lechin, a radical labor leader, 
helped to draw the party away from fascist programs. The 
810s An9eles Times, 21 Dec. 1943, 2; for examples of 
weak editorials, see the Los Angeles Times, 29 Dec. 1943, 
4; and the New York Times, 17 May 1951, 30. 
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MNR allied witp a Trotskyist party, the Partido Obrero 
Revolucionario but was always able to keep the upper hand 
since its partner had neither broad appeal nor a martyr. 9 
In power, meanwhile, was a Republican government which 
operated along traditional economic lines as had 
Penaranda. Republicans had briefly allied with the Partido 
de la Izquierda Revolucionario to overthrow Villarroel. 
From 1947 to 1951, howeve;, Republican governments under 
Enrique Hertzog and Mamerto Urriolagotia alienated the 
party and isolated its power. The Republicans themselves 
were unable to handle economic stagnation or control 
inflation, and they faced growing unrest. In congressional 
elections of 1949, the Republicans kept power, but MNR 
candidates took second, far ahead of the Partido de la 
Izquierda Revolucionario which still held posts in the 
government. That November, Siles Zuazo lea· a revolt which 
the government put down violently, and ·~ore MNR leaders 
fled to exile. 10 · 
~ 
The MNR returned politically in the presidential 
election of May 1951. It had the support of its junior 
partner, the Partido Obrero Revolucionario, and -- more 
significantly, considering what was to come -- the tiny 
9For a discussion of the Partido Obrero Revolucionario, ' 
~see Robert Alexander, Trotskyism in Latin America 
(Stanford, Calif.: 1973), 124-26. 
10aasic forces and events of the sexenio are detailed in 
.Klein, Bolivia, 220-26. 
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Partido Communista de Bolivia. Paz E
stenssoro, still in 
exile in A:gentina, won with a plura
lity of the votes and 
prepared to return to La Paz where he
 expected the congress 
to confirm his election. President U
rriolagotia accepted 
his defeat -- but not the MNR's victo
ry. He handed the 
government to General Hugo Ballivian 
and left the 
11 
country. 
The sexenio govenrments generally en
joyed good relations 
with the United sbates. Both coup-bor
n governments of 
Ballivian and the interim leaders who
 followed Villarroel 
had no difficulty securing quick reco
gnition from 
Washington. There was, however, a po
int of tension -- tin 
prices. Bolivia had s~cured high pric
es for generally 
low-grade tin during World War II but
 saw its revenue 
. 
dropping off sharply as Eastern sourc
es became available 
after Japan's defeat and as the Unite
d States became 
satisfied it had an adequate stockpil
e. In Washington, the 
Senate Preparedness Subcommittee urge
d the Reconstruction 
Finance Corporation to take a hard li
ne with Bolivia. The 
- stalemate over tin prices weakened t
he Bolivian government, 
and the price issue remained unresolv
ed on April 8, 1952, 
the last day of the sexenio. 
Bolivian political development was v
irtually unreported 
11The MNR itself claimed seventy-nine p
ercent of t~e 
vote in the _May 1951 elections. The t
otals are uncertain, 
but historians and reports at the tim
e agree that the party 
at least won a plurality in the pres
idential balloting. 
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. in the United States during the sexenio. Political 
background does appear in the reports on major 
developments, but it is generally shallow, particularly 
with regard to opposition parties. When the MNR was 
mentioned, inevitably it was described only with shallow 
and often out-of-date labels. •communist-Fascist• and 
•fascist-like" are examples used in 1951. United Press copy 
was particularly prone to such adjectives, while the MNR's 
background in Time inevitably centered on the graphic 
history of Bolivia's most famous lamppost. (The 
newsmagazine had been the only organization studied that 
carried a photograph of Villarroel's body hanging there.) 
Correspondent Foster Hailey did describe Paz Estenssoro's 
current positions, but only after the election when it 
appeared he would be taking power. News organizations did 
cover tin negqtiations in detail, though they did not 
display these stories prominently. They were covered by 
reporters in Washington where negotiations took place. 12 
The press also provided some analysis that approached 
Bolivian issues with some depth. An editorial in the Los 
Angeles Times in 1951 argued that the form of government 
enjoyed b~ the United States was not exportable to Latin 
America. It. stated: •until t~e standard of living and the 
. 
level of education are raised among the common people of 
-,, 
12F H . 1 1 . t th N k " 15 or a1 ey s accoun, see e ew Yor Times, . May 
1951,, 18. 
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most of these nations, genuine reP,ponsible self-government 
is hardly to be expected.• Correspondent Milton Bracker 
called the treatment o~Bolivian miners "sub-human• and 
described the ignor~nce and repressive social structure 
that plagued them. The New York Times ran a story on 
, 
Professor Richard E. Behrendt that described a paper he 
delivered at Colgate University. The newspaper reported his 
claim£ of exploitation of Indians and added, "He held that 
'bloody civil war' was the inevitable consequence of 
political failure to adjust to industrialization.n Such 
analyses and reports, however, were rare in the press and. 
· 13 
were not displayed prominently when they did appear~ 
THE APRIL REVOLUTION AND NATIONALIZATION 
The bloody civil war predicted by Behrendt came to 
Bolivia on April 9, 1952, with rebel troops fighting under 
the direction of Hernan Siles Zuazo. The significant 
fighting lasted three days, but the popular insurrection 
routed the army and left in power a party that would give 
Bolivia a dozen years of relative political stability. 14 
The MNR immediately faced an old problem, gaining 
recognition from the United States. It was no secret that 
13 
. Los Angeles Times, 19 May 1951, 4; New York Times, 5 
June 1949, 6E; 9 Sept. 1949, 9. 
14For an analysis of the Bolivian experience in a 
theoretical framework for revolution, see James Malloy, 
Bolivia: The Uncompleted Revolution {Pittsburgh: 1970). 
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·t·he new government intended to: .nationalize the three 
largest tin-mining firms in the country which accounted for 
• 
a two-thirds of the tin mined in Bolivia. These were owned 
by Mauricjo Hochschild, Carlos Aramayo and the heirs of 
Simon I. Patino. The Patino mines held special 
s.ignif:.i.c.a:n-c·e in 1952-. P·atino, though -Bolivian, had not set 
_,f:-o:_o·t· ·.in the country .fo:r years prior to his deat··h. Inste&d·._,. 
::h:e: lived in Europ.e·, .l:avishly spending· t;tie: :i·n-:·c.om,e -clerive.d. 
::f·rom his Bo.livia·n m·:ines. Furth·e .. rmore, twenty to 
't:w·e·nty-_,sev.en ·perc.en_,t of -t:h:e P.atino opeiration· w_a:.s :o:wn·e:d: :by .. 
. . . 
·Cqu.s·.e; ·f·:·r·ic:t:iot1 \ttith washingt.o:n. 
·:le{tder'_s. had denounceg con1.muni:sm d,esp:ite. :c:::ommun.ist sup.port- a-
a:<1:teeme:tlt.s and respect. p·tf,,ta:te l>_.r,_-o-perty; the 
na:tionali.za-tio-n o:·f. th.tee c-o·tnp·a:n·_ie·s: would not- ·a.-ft::e.c,t 
h_urtai~ea.s_ :of·· ot:b·er tin-.minin_g, co.mpan_ies in .1a-0·11v_i-a. 
·Furt_h:ertno··r·e; -1:>:a.z E·:stenssoro had· a de:<}t'ee -of 1eg·i_t.-ima:cy 
·:b-eca.use; o:f:: the e·1·ection: :of 1.9:s:1. -Fi:.na-ll·y;. t.tle· ·un:i:t_ecl ·st·:ate$ 
b-aa sirtc.e., t_h:e Franklin Ro:o-se:vel.t- adtnin_i:stra.tion based 
r-e·cogni tiort less '-10 its approva .. l of:, a :go,ternn1ent and tno_t·e 
"' ... ·. . 
:o·:11 that goverr1-ment' s a:b-iiity to exerc.ise· authority ·wi:t-h-i..:fi 
.tts ·_pc;,td.~r·s •. The MNR government was certainly doing that:. 
CompeQsatibn :be8am~ the decisive issue. Lechin and his 
followers oppo.sed it, but Paz Estenssoro kept the upp~r 
. 31 
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hand, and he agreed that compensation would be paid for any 
expropriated property. In May, Secretary of State Dean 
" 
. Acheson reported to Preside.nt Harry Truman that Paz 
Estenssoro was an able moderate to would be able to hold 
' 
power in the face of Lechin's "extreme radicals." He 
recommended recognition of the MNR government, and less 
than two months after the April Levolution, the United 
States granted that recognition. 15 
Nationalization of the mines, as Paz Estenssoro had 
indicated, did not take place immediately. The government 
was serious about proceeding cautiously and first set up a 
state-owned company, the Corporacion Minera de Bolivia, to 
run the mines. Expropriation actually took place on October 
31, though the state company had actually.seized the mines 
a few days earlier to prevent, it said, sabotage by the 
outgoing owners. 
In the meantime, the MNR government moved to incorporate 
the nation's Indian population into the political 
mainstream. It abolished the literacy requirement for 
voting, increasing the number of eligible voters nearly 
fivefold. Militia groups that had participated in the 
revolution were incorporate9 to replace the army they had 
defeated. Finally, a ministry of peasant affairs was 
created which the government hoped would inspire confidence 
15The American Republics, vol. 4 of Foreign Relations of 
the United States 1952-1954 (Washington: 1983), 492. 
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among the Indians. On the other hand, Paz Estenssoro 
. 
refused to defend one of La Paz's leading newspapers --
which happened to be controlled by Patino interests --
from mob intimidation, and it was forced to cease 
publication. At the end of 1952, the MNR was in control in 
Bolivia and attention turned to Washington where a new 
administration prepared to take office. 16 
The American press closely followed the fighting in 
April. From the first day, it had access to Siles Zuazo and 
over the next fews days stopped using one-word descriptions 
of the MNR in favor of the statements and positions of the 
party's leaders. In the early stages, the New York Times, 
the Los Angeles Times and the Wall Street Journal again 
relied on the Associated Press and United Press for 
dispatches from La Paz to cover military activity in the 
unfolding revolution. They did originate related stories 
from cities where they had correspondents. The Wall Street 
Journal, for example, reported from Washington on possible 
consequences of the revolution on tin-price negotiatons. 
Edward Morrow of the New York Times was in La Paz at~ least ,., 
as early as April 19, and apparently a Time correspondent 
also visited the capita1. 17 
16For a list· of American ent~rprises expropriated in 
Latin America, see Paul Sigmund, M~ltinationals in Latin America: The Politics of Nationaliziition (Madison, Wis.: 1980), 36-39. 
.> 
17Wall Street Journal, 15 April 1952, 3; in wire service 
33 
·• 
American journalists' interest in the story subsided 
quickly, even before the reco~nition question was settled. 
When recognition did come, accounts were not displayed 
~ 
prominently; even the New York Times relied again on the 
~
wire services and published the story deep inside. Subdued 
coverage of the MNR's first year in.power continued in Time 
and the New York Times. The latter picked up its coverage a 
bit as nationalization drew near in the fall, but the 
stories never appeared prominently. Coverage of other 
' 
newspapers was very sporadic and superficial. The Wall 
Street Journal, for example, used a brief Associated Press 
story to report that nationalization had taken place. 
Editorials, meanwhile, were meager, and commentary was 
non-existent. Nationalization was the focus of those 
editorials that did appear. The New York Times sat on the 
fence in a November 2 editorial, arguing that the United 
States should not intervene but should only look after its 
own interests. The Wall Street Journal argued three days 
later that nationalization inhibits foreign investment, but 
. ' 
did not mention the Bolivian ca3e specifically. At the Los 
Angeles Times, editors apparently forgot their position of 
the previous year, and declared on October 26: "It is also 
and newspaper accounts, a dateline indicates the location 
of the correspondent, which is not necessarily the location 
of events d~scribed.- Time does not use datelines, but it 
appears from the context of its 28 April 1952 story that a 
correspondent had been in La Paz. 
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not true that Communism grows from the roots of poverty and 
insecurity." Again, the editorial did not refer 
specifically to Bolivia. It was one of a flow of extreme 
pieces rabidly attacking any position taken by Adlai 
Stevenson. Columnist Polyzoides was also caught up in the 
issues raised in the presidential election, particularly 
those involving Korea, and he ignored the nationalization 
issue completely. 18 
NINETEEN FIFTY-THREE 
The revolutionary government's announcement that it \ 
, 
r 
' 
intended to compensate owners for expropriated property was 
one thing. Actually working out the terms was another. 
Furthermore, the MNR faced another major challenge for the 
first time -- a Republican administration in the United 
States. As the decisive year in u.s.-Bolivian relations 
opened, Washington became the focus of the MNR's future. 
The foreign policy of the Eisenhower administration 
sought to contain communism. As a candidate, Dwight D. 
Eisenhower had criticized the containment doctrine of the 
Truman administration in favor of a policy that would push 
back communism, but upon taking office he essentially 
adopted the policy of his predecessor. Eisenhower saw the 
communist threat as mainly external. He believed that 
1810s Angeles Times, 26 Oct. 1952, II-4; 2 Nov. 1952, 
17; 3 Nov. 1952, 28. , 
, 
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forei~n aid was an efficient means toward global security. 
It could take place either in the form of direct military 
gifts to a nation or in the f0rrn of economic aid. The 
latter, he felt, would allow governments to reallocate 
resources to maintain military strength. The new president 
preferred dealing with moderate elected governments, but 
was willing to live with military dictatorships which did 
not threaten the economic status quo. He was uncomfortable 
with revolutionary governments, 19 
John Foster Dulles, Eisenhower's powerful secretary of 
state, paid little attention to South America. He was 
cautious about the potential for Soviet expansion into the 
area but did not believe the Soviet Union had made any 
serious efforts on that continent. John Moors Cabot, the 
assistant secretary of state in charge of Latin American 
affairs until 1954, favored economic development of Latin 
America and discouraged trade barriers in the hope of 
developing mutual trade. He stated that he favored a 
partnership rather than a leadership role for the United 
States in its Latin American policy. 20 
19For Eisenhower's foreign-policy view, see Charles 
Alexander, Holdin the Line: The Eisenhower Era 1952-1961 
(Bloomington, Ind., and London: 1975, especially 42-43; 
administration fears of comrnunisim in Bolivia appear in 
Cabinet minutes of 3 July 1953 and in a 2 Sept. 1953 letter 
from Dulles to Harold Stassen of the Foreign Operations 
Administration~ for these, see Republics, 534, 535. 
20John Moors Cabot, Toward OQr Common Destiny (Medford, 
Mass: 1954), v-vi, 61-81. 
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Thus, the potential existed for positive relations 
between La Paz and Washington if Eisenhower's discomfort 
with the revolutionary nature of the MNR government could 
be overcome. Two events were important in bringing this 
about. The first was settlement of the claims of Patino 
stockholders. Talks had begun badly when Patino officials 
made huge claims and the Bolivian government countered with 
enormous fines against the company for alleged violations 
in the past. In the spring of 1953, however, bbth parties 
adopted realistic goals and moved toward a settlement. On 
June 12, Bolivian Ambassador Victor Andrade announced that 
an agreement had been reached for direct payments from the 
government to the Patino company based on a-complex 
formula tied to tin prices. Within a· month, the United 
States supported the settlement with a one-year contract to 
buy tin at world market prices. 
The second key event was the summer mission of Milton 
Eisenhower to Latin America as the personal representative 
of his brother. Milton Eisenhower had been impressed 
earlier by the gains of a growing middle class in Mexico 
/ 
following its revolution, and during his \953 trip, he 
became convinced that social change was a necessary part of 
development of the region. In Bolivia, he noted the 
agricultural potential around Santa Cruz. He found that Paz 
Estenssoro was interested in obtaining funds for 
agricultural as well as industrial development. Milton 
,, 37 
Eisenhower had heard allegations that the Bolivian 
president was a communist, but he later wrote, • .•• it is 
surprising that this revolutionary ••• did not even hint 
that the orthodox approach of financial aid was 
. ff" . t • 21 1nsu 1c1en. 
The stage for good relations was set. Before leaving 
Bolivia, Milton Eisenhower called Dulles to request 
emergency food aid for Bolivia. He got it. In October, 
Presidents Eisenhowrr and Paz Estenssoro exchanged letters 
formalizing an errlergency assistance program which doubled 
technical assistance, provided $5_million- in agricultural 
surpluses, 3nd provided $4 million in essential commodities 
-- all under existing legislation. The events of the summer 
and fall led by the end of the decade to more than $100 
million in aid, the most per-capita aid to any country in 
the world. The political stability of the MNR governments 
through 1964 allowed social change to take place in 
Bolivia, much of it associated with the agricultural reform 
legislation passed by Bolivia in 1953.
22 
21Milton Eisenhower, The Wine Is Bitter: The United 
States and Latin America (Garden City, N.Y.: 1963), 194-95. 
22For a detailed account of ·united States aid to Bolivia 
in the 1950s, see James Wilkie, The Bolivian Revolution and 
u.s. Aid since 1952 (Los Angel~s: 1969), especially 48; a 
negative view -of the Eisenhower aid pro~ram is expressed by 
Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., A Thousand Das: John F.· Kenned 
in the White House (Boston: 1965, 181-82; for details of 
Bolivia's agrarian reform program, see Robert Alexander, 
Agrarian reform in Latiri America {New York: 1974). 
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The press gave some attention to the negotiations 
between the Bolivian government and the Patino officials, 
though it was not prominent. Both the New York Times and' 
the Wall Street Journal carried reports based on public 
statements by Ambassador_Andrade when the agreement was 
reached, and the former even followed up with an editorial 
praising the accord. Likewise, the October agreement was 
covered on a low level based on official releases. On the 
other hand, Time had given serious treatment to Bolivia's 
agrarian reform in its August 17 issue • 
• 
But virtually untouched by the press was Milton 
Eisenhower's Latin American trip. Accounts of the mission's 
departure were superficial. The wire services apparently 
were supplying at least basic reports on the trip, but they 
appeared in the New York Times and the Los Angeles Times as 
undisguised fillers on the few occasions they appeared at 
all. Time carried reports on July 6 and July 27, but the 
Bolivian stop was never mentioned. Milton Eisenhower's 
report to his brother was covered superficially. The New 
York Times ran it prominently on November 22, beginning on 
the tront page and including nearly a page of excerpts, but 
it based the story largely on official quotes and the 
report itself and provided no analysis or backgrouria. 23 
23A filler is a one- or two-paragraph item used to fill 
out a column. For examples, see New York Times, 2 July-
1953, 11; Los Angeles Times, 5 July 1·953, 14. 
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This is not to say that the daily or weekly press should 
have been able to anticipate the long-term impact of the 
events of 1953, but the effect of the missing coverage was 
that the Eisenhower administration policy toward Bolivia 
was established outside the public spotlight • 
40 
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CHAPTER III. COMMUNICATION THROUGH THE PRESS 
Augusto Cespedes believed that in February 1946 the 
United States State Department signaled its approva~for an 
overthrow of the government of President Gualberto 
Villarroel. Cespedes -- a novelist, publicist, and early 
MNR activist -- believed the mechanism for that message was 
the State Department Blue Book which portrayed the Bolivian 
government as a.supporter of Juan Peron in his effort to 
protect surviving Nazi elements. 1 
The Blue Book was summarized in detail in the New York 
Times. The newspaper reported the document's charges that 
Per6n had not f~lly supported the war effort ~nd that he 
was protecting Nazi interests that might lead to a 
resurgence of nazism in the world. These interests, the 
Blue Book said, had taken root in Bolivia durihg the 
December 1943 coup. A Times editorial the same day argued 
that the State Department had proved its claims, including 
its contention that only a lack of weapons had prevented 
. 2 
Argentina from entering the war on the side o( the Axis • 
. 
1cole Blasier, The Hovering Giant: u.s. ResEonses to 
Revolutionary Change in Latin America (Pittsburgh: 1976), 
50, 284. 
-~ 
2New York Times, 13 Feb. 1946, 1, 17, 22; the notion 
that an Argentine-German alliance posed any treat to the 
western hemisphere during or after World War II is refuted 
! 
. 
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The Times report may have circulated the contents of the 
Blue Book more quickly than they might have circulated 
otherwi$e, but it is unlikely that the story was in itself 
a signal since it largely quoted a book that had been 
openly published and was available throughout Latin 
America. At best, the editorial might have hinted that the 
State Department was unlikely to run into opposition at 
home, but such a consideration was unlikely to have any 
real influence with parties who might have been plotting an 
overthrow of the Bolivian government in 1946. 
What followed in the Times, however, is a different 
matter. The day after the State Department released the 
Blue Book; Assistant Secretary of State Spruille Braden 
spoke to a luncheon of advertising, magazine, newspaper, 
and radio representatives. His comments were published the 
next day: " ••• no government that denies basic human rights 
and uses force to prevent their expression can be 
considered, in our eyes, a legitimate, and thus 
respectable, government." Bolivia was not named, but 
Villarroel had used force against his opponents, and the 
Blue Book had made clear Braden's feelings toward the 
leaders in La Paz .• Might Braden, a former ambassador to 
Argentina who consistently perceived Argentine-Nazi ties, 
by Ronald Newton, "The United states, the German-
Argentines, and the Myt~ of the Fourth Reich, 1943-47,• 
¥-ispanic American ·Historical Review 64 (Feb. 1984), 81-103. 
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be acting alone? Peron immediately raised the question. 
The New York Times transmitted the answer. President Harry 
Truman and Secretary of State James Byrnes, the newspaper 
reported, had declared at a news con~erence that they stood 
behind the Blue Book and that, in fact, the president had 
personally read and approved its contents. 3 
The American position reappeared in print a few months 
later. The Times quoted-Braden's address to a Clark 
University audience: Victory in World War II had not killed 
the ideologies of nazism or fascism. They were still as 
alive as communism and were simply biding their time until 
complacency set in. 4 
The United States government was not the only body to 
communicate through the press. The New York Times reported 
that the University Students Federation in La Paz had 
demanded that Bolivia.break relations with the •Argentine 
military Fascist government." The students argued that the 
Blue Book "demonstrated clearly that the Bolivian 
revolution obeyed the instructions of Ge~an nazism" via 
Argentine leaders, a statement which easily could be 
interpreted as support for a potential overthrow. 5 
The existence of quotations in a newspaper cannot tell 
3 New York 
4 New York 
5New York 
Times, 
Times, 
Times, 
14 Feb. 1946, 16; 16 Feb. 1946, 14. 
27 May 1946, 10. 
25 Feb. 1946, 3. 
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us whether the men quoted intended to undermine Gualberto 
Villarroel or whether they encouraged a select group of 
readers to act against the rulers of Bolivia. But a message 
-- conciously implied or not -- was there, and two months 
after the Clark speech, Villarroel was dead, and his 
surviving followers claimed from exile in Buenos Aires that 
Spruille Braden had been the mastermind behind the coup. 
Time summed up the reaction of the United States a few days 
later: • ••• the State Department freely confessed that it 
was the most welcome revolution in years.• 6 
POSITIONS OF NEW GOVERNMENTS 
Much communication carried through the press was more 
straightforward. The most consistent examples are 
~ 
statements, often issued directly to the press, by new 
Bolivian governments attempting to gain support or at least 
recognition from the United States. 
such a motive is clear when Villarroel came to power in 
December 1943 with the help of Victor Paz Estenssoro. The 
United States was at war with Germany, and the strategy for 
the new Bolivian government was obvious. On the day they 
took power, the new leaders went to the international press· 
which reported and interpreted their statements: "The 
members of the junta immediately made a statement to the 
press designed to allay public apprehension and to assure 
6New York Times, 27 July 1946, 5; Time, 5 Aug. 1946, 47. 
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the United Nations that the revolutionary movement was in 
no way directed at them." Paz Estenssoro pledged to respect 
international agreements and cooperate fully with other 
American republics. He and Villarroel each stated that 
their coup would affect domestic policy only, and the new 
president declared that a return of civil rights to 
Bolivians was his domestic goal. 7 
In the days that followed, other coup officials and 
supporters reinforced and expanded on the positions of 
Villarroel and Paz Estenssoro. Foreign Minister Jose 
Tamayo backed their statements in a meeting with the 
diplomatic corps. Victor Andrade, then the new minister of 
labor, announced a plan for social security intended to 
raise the living standards of the peasants and the miners. 
In Washington, the Bolivian embassy said Bolivia would 
respect its 1938 constitution and meet commitments to the 
Allies. All these statements were reported in American 
Qa 
newspapers. 
Within a week of the coup, Villarroel and Paz Estenssoro 
followed with additional statements specifically intended 
to distance the Bolivian government from German influences. 
Jews, said the president, were treated the same as Aryans 
7New York Times, 21 Dec. 1943, 1, 12, 13; Time, 27 Dec. 
1943, 36. 
8New York Times, 22 Dec. 1943, 1, 3; 24 Dec. 1943, 5; 
Los Angeles Times, 25 Dec. 1943, 9. 
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under the Bolivian constitution. •How could we accept a 
cult of supposed Aryan supremacy when a large part of our 
people are Indians or of mixed Indian and White blood?" he 
asked. Paz Rstenssoro repeated that no Nazi elements had 
influence with the new government. Again the remarks 
appeared in print in the United states. 9 
I 
The intense press coverage of the revolution subsided 
after the first week, but occasionally surfaced as the 
Bolivians continued their efforts to obtain recognition 
from Washington. Seven weeks after the coup, the New York 
Times quoted Villarroel's promise that his government would 
would continue as a signator of the Atlantic Charter and 
that Bolivia would remain on the side of the Allies. In 
remarks that appear from context to be answers to reporters 
questions, the president said Argentina's announced break 
with the Axis would dispel claims of a Bolivian-Argentine-
Axis connection. Four days later, following the resignation 
of MNR members Augusto c&spedes and Carlos Montenegro from 
the cabinet, Paz Estenssoro conducted a telephone interview 
from La Paz with the Associated Press office in Buenos 
Aires. He specifically expressed his hope that the cabinet 
changes would result in quick recognition. 10 
,1 ~ 
Following the violent overthrow of the Villarroel 
9New York Times, 26 Dec. 1943, 7; 27 Dec. 1943, 7. 
--------,? 
10New York Times, 8 Feb. 1944, 10; 12 Feb. 1944, 7. 
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government, the junta that took power had little trouble 
gaining the.recognition of the United States. Still, its 
leaders wfent to the press to pay tribute to democratic 
principles. Time quoted one: •we will call elections and 
then turn over power to a government chosen by the 
people.• 11 
The pattern continued into the next decade. In 1951, 
exiled Victor Paz Estenssoro, victorious in the 
presidential election, made plans to take office which 
included_ making statements similar td those of 1943. He 
restated his oppostion to nazism and communism and denied 
he was anti-American or anti-capitalist. He said he would 
halt inflation, begin an education campaign for ~he masses, 
reorganize finance and eliminate graft, and establish good 
. relations with the United States and other members of the 
United Nations. •what I stand for," wrote correspondent 
Foster Hailey quoting Paz Estenssoro in Buenos Aires, "is 
the reinvestment of profits from Bolivia's natural ~ 
resources in Bolivia to improve my country." He added he 
would welcome technical assistance. 12 
The next positions, of course, came from Gen. Hugo 
Ballivi&n in the hours after he seized the government to 
prevent Paz Estenssoro from taking office. The new 
11Time, 5 Aug. 1946, 48. 
12New York Times, 15 May 1951, 18. 
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president insisted his actions were not a "barracks coup,• 
but were intended to restore peace and order. His rule 
would be temporary, and his predecessor, Mamerto 
Urriolagotia, had left voluntarily. The international press 
J 
would not be censored, and censorship of the local press 
would be strictly transitory. His message followed Paz 
Estenssoro's into print in the United states by two days. 13 
When the MNR rode a popular revolution into power on 
April 9-11, 1952, its leaders began a campaigr. which 
matched the intensity of the 1943 effort. Long before the 
\ 
success of the revolution had been determined, Hernan 
Siles Zuazo met with reporters, including an Associated 
Press correspondent in La Paz. At tlie same time in Buenos 
Aires, Paz Estenssoro met with representatives from the 
Associated Press and the New York Times. The first priority 
for both men was to deny any connection between the 
t.• ... 
revolution and international communism. Both insisted the 
forces behind the action were democratic, and Paz 
Estenssoro, with the election of the previous May in mind, 
described the violence as a revolutionary return to 
legality. 14 
Prior to Paz Estenssoro's return to Bolivia, Siles Zuazo 
held center stag~ with the press for the next few days. He 
13New York Times, 17 May,,,1951, 1, 15. 
14New York Times, 10 April 1952, 1, 3. 
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repeated the prior assurances and added that his party 
would respect private property and international~treaties. 
H~ adopted Paz Estenssoro's claim of legitimacy by 
declaring himself the "constitutional Vice President of the 
15 
republ.ic exercising executive power." 
A major priority for Paz Estenssoro upon assuming the 
presidency was to deal with the question of nationalization 
of the three large tin mining companies. The day after his 
inauguration, the Associated Press quoted unnamed advisers 
of the president who said that nationalization was too 
' 
large and complex a problem to be handled hastily. Paz 
Estenssoro himself later gave details in an interview 
filmed specifically for release in the United States: •we 
want to nationalize our mines, but not hurredly and without 
confusion •.•• if possible we. want to reach an agreement 
with the mine owners." The next day, the president met with 
foreign correspondents to stress that only the three giant 
mining companies, not the twenty-five medium-sized 
companies or the 2,500 small companies, would be 
t . 1· a 16 na 1ona 1ze. 
Two weeks after the revolution, Paz Estenssoro and Siles 
Zuazo denied a familiar charg~_trom private citizen 
15New York Times, 12 Apiil 1952, 1, 4; 13 April 1952, 
11. ~ 
16New York Times, 17 April 1952, 3; Wall Street Journal, 
18 April 1952, 5; New York Times, 18 April 1952, 5; 19 
April 1952, J; 20 ·April 1952, 22. 
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Spruille Braden that the revolution had been directed by 
Argentina. In the weeks that followed prior to recognition 
by the United States, the press twice quoted Paz Estenssoro 
as he repeated his statements on nationalization. On one 
occasion Juan Lech1n's comments were reported; 
nationalization would be "not a Communist measure but one 
of national self defense.• In the latter case, Lech1n 
specifically supported Paz Estenssoro after taking a more 
radical stance earlier. In Washington, when Secretary of 
State Dean Acheson recommended recognition of the MNR 
govenrment, he specifically cited a staternent:by Paz 
Estenssoro to a Time correspondent that the MNR would 
-
. t .· t t ', 1 b J · t · l 7 respec 1n erna 1ona o _1ga ions. 
TOO MANY LISTENERS 
One of the problems that faced the MNR leaders was that 
the United States received through the press messages 
intended for others. For example, Paz Estenssoro avoided 
talking about nationalization in his inaugural address, 
possibly because his comments on the subject to a La Paz 
crowd might alien~t~ the United States, which would 
"r--~· 
certainly be paying attention to such a major address. 
Similarly, signals to the United States through the press 
17New York Times, 24 April 1952, 10; 8 May 1952, 4; 
Time, 19 May 1952, 47; The American Republics, vol. 4 of 
Forei n Relations of the United States 1952-1954 
Washington: 1983 , 492. 
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were openly visible to anyone with access to American 
newspapers. The same Hernan Siles Zuazo who wanted the 
United States to accept him as a non-communist was quoted 
speaking to his people: "We are going to work because the 
Bolivian economy should be Bolivian and not that of 
exploiters who live abroad.• Paz Estenssoro in his first 
speech to his people upon returning ·home opened the touchy 
question of nationalization by declaring he would appoint a 
panel to prepare for just that. 18 
~ 
Paz Estenssoro also faced the problem of statements from 
members or supporters of his party. Shortly after the April 
revolution, the Militant and Labor Action, Trotskyite 
newspapers in the United States, supported the revolution 
while calling for the goals spelled out by the Partido 
Obrero Revolucionario, nationalization of mines and 
railroads without compensation and nexpulsion of 
imperialism.a Shortly after nationalization of the major 
tin mines, the president repeated his position that lawful 
compensation must be paid. At almost the same moment, 
Lechin was declaring, "Nationalization must be carried out 
without payment to the thieving tin barons.• 19 
Paz Estenssoro himself h~d to talk tough to a L~ Paz 
audience, but his remarks were bound to reach Washington. 
18New York Times, l~April 1952, 1, 4; 16 April 1952, 8. 
19 · Robert Alexander, Trotskyism in Latin America (Stamford, Calif.: 1973), 129-31; Time, 10 Nov. 1952, 46. 
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During negotiations over compensation, he told his people, 
"We will not compromise nor will we consent to any deal 
prejudicial to Bolivia in order to sell our tin.• The 
Associated Press writer present did not restrict his 
reporting to the president's remarks, however. The crowd, 
he wrote, had shouted •neath to Yankee imperialism.•
20 
Paz Estenssoro's vocal audience represents another group 
whose feelings were circulated by the press -- those with 
no access to official channels. In the days following 
Ballivi&n's seizure of power to invalidate the May 1951 
election, American news organizations described a visual 
message from unnamed opponents of the general. When dusk 
fell over La Paz in the hours after the coup, at least two 
carefully constructed fires could be seen burning in the 
hills around the capital. The flames spelled •MNR.•
21 
VARIED MESSAGE-SENDERS 
Signals from named and unnamed opponents moved through 
American news organizations from the first days of the 
Villarroel government. In December 1943, the Associated 
Press quoted unnamed sources in La Paz who called Bolivia's 
new leaders •militantly anti-United States.• Two years 
later, the United Press quoted anti-government deputies in 
20New York Times, 8 Jan. 1953, 5. • 
. 
21New York Times, 18 May 1951, 15; Time, 28 May 1951, 
44. 
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the Bolivian congress who accused the MNR of inciting 
workers to attack the private property of the government's 
22 
opponents. 
The pattern was the same during the sexenio. When Juan 
Per6n met President Enrique Hertzog in the Bolivian 
frontier town of Yacuiba in 1947, a message from the 
Argentine leader made its way through the American press: 
"The American nations must take care, General Per6n said, 
that eitremist forces 'of the left or of the right' did not 
~ gain ascendancy.• During the 1949 unrest, the Associated 
Press quoted a rebel radio station in Santa Cruz that Paz 
Estenssoro was the president of the rebel government. 
During the 1951 election campaign, Bolivian communists 
proclaimed their support for Paz Estenssoro, promising his 
election would purge U.S. influence. (They did not, 
- 23 however, adopt the same platform as the MNR.) 
Two weeks after the nationalization of the big three 
mining companies, six American mining engineers and 
metalurgists formerly employed by the Aramayo mines met 
···: 
with the press in New York. They estimated that eighty to 
ninety percent of foreign technical workers would leave 
under nationalization and that production would drop within 
22Los Angeles Times, 21 Dec. 1943, 2; New York Times, 26 
Dec. 1945, 4. 
23New York Times, 24 Oct. 1947, 4; 7 Sept. 1949, 20; 23 
April 1951, 5. \ 
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a year. One of them said, "It's impossible to work under 
the Bolivian government and particularly with the workers 
getting more and more control of the mines." Another 
elaborated: "Ever since April I've had inspectors and 
soldiers virtually in my front room." Smelters Development 
Corporation, a subsidiary of the Patino mines, used the 
letters page of the New York Times to warn its 
stockholders, suggesting Smelters was also interested in 
reaching a wider audience. The letter warned of "fantastic 
claims" by the Bolivian government which it saw as an 
ff t t d t . 24 e or ore uce compensa 10n. 
Ousted presidents were a frequent source of statements 
through the press. A day after Villarroel had taken power 
from him, Enrique Pefiaranda told a United Press 
correspondent in Arica, Chile, that he had not resigned. 
The MNR, he said, had "Nazi-Fascist tendencies without 
popular sympathies." He claimed it also lacked support of 
army officers. A few months later, PeBaranda spoke out 
again, this time to the Associated Press in Arequipa, Peru, 
when it appeared that the United States was nearing a 
decision to at last recognize the Villarroel government. He 
claimed that political prisoners were being tortured in 
Bolivia, and he described the Bolivian government as a 
"Hitlerist regime" :,1sing "Gestapo methods." Shortly before 
24waJ1 Street Journal, 15 Nov. 1952, 2; New York Times, 
20 Nov./ 1952, 51. 
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nationalization of the mines in 1952, former President 
,, 
Enrique Hertzog, speaking to the United Press in Buenos 
Aires, described sharp divisions within the MNR. He claimed 
Lechin was a communist and. that communist supporters had 
25 
staged terror attacks to purge opponents. 
MNR leaders followed the same pattern during the 
sexenio. In 1949, Paz Estenssoro accused the government of 
nspontaneous slaughterw of strikers in the Patino mines. 
He claimed that Bolivia had no responsib~e government and 
that the regime in power appeared desperate. After 
Ballivian's seizure of power in 1951, the MNR leader 
declared that the coup was an attempt to deny him of the 
presidency and to prevent the institution of his programs 
"for the public's benefit." 26 
Two days later, Siles Zuazo granted an interview with 
correspondent Foster Hailey in an attempt to project a 
moderate image. He said he hoped for a peaceful solution to 
the crisis and defended young MNR leaders who had been 
accused of an attack on a police headquarters. He said that 
the MNR would accept a "constitutional resolution of the 
crisis• and worried that recognition of the Ballivian 
government by the United States or other American nations 
would constitute a defeat for democratic principles. 
25 1 . . 9 Los Ange es Times, 22 Dec. 1 43, 5; New York Times, 14 
May 1944, 25; 2 Sept. 1952, 6. 
26Ne·w York · 30 949 __________ T_i_m_e_s, May 1 , 5; 17 May 1951, 1, 15. 
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Communism in Bolivia, he concluded, would have been 
stronger without the social reforms of the Villarroel 
years. A week later both Paz Estenssoro in Buenos Aires and 
Siles Zuazo in La Paz granted interviews to deny an 
alliance with communists and to claim they supported a 
f 1 1 t . 27 peace u sou 10n. 
POSITIONS OF ESTABLISHED GOVERNMENTS 
Signals from the Bolivian government to Washington 
through the American press were most frequent immediately 
after changes of government, largely because press coverage 
was heaviest at those times. Nonetheless, signals did 
occasionally flow at other times. Paz Estenssoro, for 
example, spelled out the type of aid he sought well after 
he had received recogniton in 1952. He would accept United 
Nations technical aid, he said, but not administative aid. 
He also took the opportunity to deny continuing charges of 
. t . fl 28 P~ron1s 1n uence. 
Earlier, Ballivian's government on two occasions used 
the press to threaten the United States that it would file 
charges of economic aggression with the Organization of 
American States if Washington did not renew negotiations on 
tin prices. In his New Year's address, the president argued. 
that Bolivia might perish if it could not get the price for 
27New York Times, 19 May 1951, 6; 27 May 1951, 6E. 
28New York Times, 28 June 1952, 4. 
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tin it demanded from the Reconstruction Finance 
. 29 
corporation. 
Earlier seAenio governments on numerous occasions used 
the press to level charges against MNR whenever it seemed 
to be getting strong. The party was blamed for an Indian 
uprising in Cochabamba in 1947 and was described as 
"communism of the Right" in 1948. During the 1949 unrest, 
the government described te MNR as a "violently nationalist 
party" of Villarroel and as "Nazi-Fascist. 1 The following 
year, Mamerto Urriolagotia warned of a coalition between 
"Communists and extreme rightists.• 30 
The nationalization issue generated enough coverage to 
provide substantial means for the MNR government to send 
signals. When Victor Andrade returned as ambassador, he 
" 
reminded the press that Bolivia intended to go slow on 
nationalization. On the eve of nationalization, Paz ~~ 
Estenssoro told the United Press that compensation would be 
paid. When the former engineers· claimed that production 
would drop, Andrade defended the government's ability to 
mine tin when he spoke before.a luncheon of the Pan 
6 29Time, 14 Jan. 1952, 441 New York Times, 1 March 1952, 
4; 2 Jan. 1952, 3. 
30New York Times, 7 Feb. 1947, 91 21 Nov. 1948, 251 29 
Aug. 1949, 7; 30 Aug. 1949, 10; 10 April 1950, 7. 
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American Women's Association which was covered by the New 
31 York press. 
As press coverage declined in 1953, however, so did the 
opportunity to communicate through the press. The 
Associated Press covered a seminar in which Paz Estenssoro 
reminded MNR officials, •we cannot be anti-capitalist.• A 
few months later during a speech marking the first 
anniversary of the April revolution, -Paz Estenssoro 
promised free elections with the participation of women, 
land reform, and reorganization of Bolivia's finances. 
These two instances, however, were exceptions during the 
important period immediately after the Eisenhower 
administration had taken office. 32 
SIGNALS FROM THE UNITED STATES 
Communication through the American press from Washington 
to La Paz was far less frequent than communication in the 
ot~er fiirection. What the press did send southward was 
. r 
concentrated on three events: recognition of the Villarroel 
government, the overthrow of that government, and the 
negotiations over tin prices with the Ballivian 
government. 
In the days following Villarroel's seizure of power in 
31New York Times, 18 July 1952, 5; 30 Oct. 1952, 13; 16 
Nov. 1952, 32. 
32New York Times, 10 Jan. 1953, Jr Time, 20 April 1953, 
so. 
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1943, Washington initially let it be known that it had 
strong doubts about the new Bolivian leaders but left 
itself leeway to go either way. Secretary of State Cordell 
Hull announced that questions over Axis ties hung over any 
decision on recognition, and he did not discourage exiled 
President Penaranda's claim that he had not resigned. 
Within a week of the revolt, the New York Times obtained 
the text of a cable from Hull to Uruguayan Foreign Minister 
Alberto Guani, the president of a Pan-American advisory 
committee on political defense. Hull said that American 
nations who had broken relations with or declared war on 
the Axis would withhold recognition of any government 
coming to power by force until they had consulted one 
another. 33 
Not long after, Hull announced the State Department had 
evidence that suggested the revolution had indeed been 
aided by·outside forces. The New York Times concluded from 
----·-_.,.-
the secretary's remarks: "There is a possibility that, in 
view of Mr. Hull's statement, counter-revolutionists in 
Bolivia may be encouraged to attempt the ousting of the 
revolutionary junta ••• " Attempted coups did, in fact, take 
place in April and October 1944. 34 
After the first attempted coup, however, Washington 
() 
33New York Times, 23 Dec. 1943, 5; 26 Dec. 1943, 7. 
34New York T1'rnes, 8 Jan 1944 1 5 
• I I • 
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apparently concluded that the Villarroel government would 
endure. A signal of the change of heart came through an 
unofficial source. The New York Times reported that an 
unnamed State Department official •frankly admitted today 
that this Government did not want to continue any longer 
than necessary the policy of non-recognition of the 
I 
Bolivian govern~ent.• 35 
By the time Ballivian took power in 1951, the United 
States had a stockpile of tin more than adequate for its 
needs. The American position appeared in Time: 
The fight (over tin prices) also served notice 
to all raw-material-producing countries of the 
world that the U.S. is willing to pay a fair 
price for materials, but that it 36 won't be cheated, even by its friends. 
The following January, Secretary of State Dean Acheson 
signaled conciliation by expressing confidence that the 
United States and Bolivia could reach an agreement on tin 
prices. The incoming director of the Reconstruction Finance 
Corporation signaled similar feelings, indicating he would 
keep an open mind until he had begun.discussions. But 
another message came from the outgoing director of the RFC, 
.w. Stuart Symington, who openly said in a farewell news 
35New York Times, 11 May 1944, 12. 
36T. 1me, 30 July 1951, 75. 
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conference, "I am sure that nobody is going to pay anything 
like the price the Bolivians have been asking." 37 
Missing from the record were specific signals to the 
Bolivian government from Dwight Eisenhower during the 
election campaign of 1952. He made four major foreign 
policy speeches during the campaign in which he spoke 
mostly in very vague, general terms -- all quite normal for 
an American presidential campaign. When he did mention a 
. 
specific country or region, it was always Korea or Europe. 
A few days before the election, both candidates did send a 
letter to a Brazilian newspaper group in which they 
supported Pan-Americanism and the Good Neighbor Policy, but 
only in the most general terms. 38 
INTELLIGENCE 
In addition to using the press as a medium to send 
signals, the Americans and Bolivians used it as a means of 
keeping informed about one another. American 
administrations got some major news through the press over 
the years. First word of the 1956 Suez invasion by Britain, 
• "-r'.r 
France and Israel came to the Eisenhower administration 
,from reporters, for example.,. The same was true for 
r·-~·4 
I 
_;,1--
relations with Bolivia. Press accounts of the coup that 
37New York Times, 5 Jan. 1952, 18; 10 Jan. 1952, 47; 15 
Jan. 1952, 35. 
f) 
38New York Times, 23 Sept. 1952; 16; 2 Oct. 1952, 20; 12 
Octs 1952, l; 22 Oct. 1952, 17; 1 Nov. 1952, 13. 
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overthrew Villarroel were more detailed than those coming 
through che State Department's own channels, a department 
spokesman admitted. During unrest in the Patino mines in 
1949, the State Department said it had heard nothing when 
press-reports indicated 150 deaths had taken place. Press 
reports of th~)military situation during revolts are 
common, and in 1951, the Associated Press reported the vote 
count in the presidential election. 39 
Bolivians had access to an ocean of information about 
the Americans through the American press. For example, the 
news pages of the 1940s were full of concerns about the 
world war and nazism while the news pages of the 1950s 
focused on Americans' worries about communism. Victor Paz 
Estenssoro and Victor Andrade didn't have to look far to 
know anti-nazism and anti-communism were platforms to adopt 
' \~ 
if they wanted good relations the United States. 
It is not reasonable to assume that this information was 
available only through the press. By the same token, it is 
not reasonable to assume that the signals and information 
in the examples throughout this chapter were not in many 
cases transmitted by other means than news pages. Still, 
the examples,are frequent enough and clear enough to 
provide a check on information coming through other 
39
steven Ambrose, Ike's s ies: Eisenhower and the 
Espionage Establishment Garden City, N.Y.: 1981 ~ 256; New 
York Tim~s, 23 July 1946, 12; 30 May 1949, 1, 5; Los 
Angeles Times, 6 May 1951, 27. -
62 l ) 
,/ 
channels. It gave, for example, the State Department a 
means of weighing messages it received from MNR leaders 
against the messages the MNR leaders were sending to their 
own people. That this pattern occurred is strong supporting 
evidence for James Reson's argument that the press 
exercises direct influence as a means of communication 
between governments. It even suggests his argument should 
be taken a step further, in that the press provides a means 
of communication with factions or exiles who do not have 
direct access to formal channels. 
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CHAPTER IV. RELATIONS WITH SOURCES 
On April 9, 1952, the telephone rang in the Buenos Aires 
apartment of an exiled Bolivian politician. Victor Paz 
C 
Estenssoro answered, and as he listened to the caller from 
La Paz -- or as he pretended to listen later in the day --
an Associated Press photographer snapped his picture. The 
next day a two-column AP Radiophoto accompanied the news of 
the outbreak the April revolution in the New York Times. 
This, the caption declared, was the leader of the rebel 
movement "as he learned by telephone ... of the 
rebellion." 1 
was a photographer over for tea just as Paz Estenssoro 
received his historic call? It seems unlikely. Rather, Paz 
Estenssoro had arranged what would later be called a photo 
opportunity. Eithet the Bolivian had arranged to have the 
photographer present when the call came through or he 
simply posed with his telephone after the news had broken. 
In either case, the photographer had an interest in 
providing his editors with an image when none was likely to 
be available from the turbulent Bolivian capital. Paz 
Estenssoro, like any middle-class Latin American man of the 
time, wanted to appear as a well-dressed, professional. The 
1New York Times, 40 April 1952, 3. 
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two clearly cooperated to satisfy their respective needs. 
Cooperation was plentiful, though not consistent, 
between the participants in Bolivian events from ·1941 to 
1953 and the journalists who covered them. Describing that 
relationship, however, requires the drawing of conclusions 
from the content of published material, sometimes simply 
from the choice of words. Assumptions may be incorrect in 
some instances, but the cumulative evidence of many 
examples provides a reliable means of judging Reston's 
thesis for relationships between sources and journalists. 
The most common assumption will be the source of the 
journalists' reports. Consider Time's description of the 
State Department reaction to the December 1943 coup which 
put Gualberto Villarroel in power. It concluded: 
Such were the churning waters from which the 
u.s. State Department was trying to pull an 
acceptable fish. But much of the Department's 
energy was spent in squabbling over what sort of 
fish it wanted and what to use for bait. Caught 
unawares and still in a stew, the Department 
showed clearly that it had no unified policy, that 
it was hardly more than a maze 2 ) of corridors full of warring tribes. 
Time clearly had a source among the insiders in the 
istate Department, probably several given the broad 
p~rspective of the passage and the resources of a national 
organization which regularly covered foreign policy. 
2Time, 10 Jan. 1944, 40. 
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IDENTIFIABLE SOURCES 
In at least two instances, sources meeting journalists 
were openly identified in circumstances other than official 
statements. The Chilean foreign minister in 1944 leaked the 
corr~ct news that Chile and other American nations would 
jointly recognize the Villarroel government on June 23. The 
engineers who left the Bolivian mines following 
nationalization eight years later were listed by name in 
the New York Times, perhaps because their accounts were 
more authoritative than if they had come from unnamed 
sources, perhaps because they had no fear of repercussions 
since they had already left their jobs. 3 
Whatever the motive for cooperation with journalists, 
numerous references to unnamed sources identified the body 
in which the source worked either outright or through 
overwhelming circumstantial evidence. When the Villarroel 
government took power, for example, one news item 
specifically indentified the Bolivian embassy in Washington 
as the source of speculation about the prospects for peace 
in Bolivia. When speculation arose that Bolivia might 
recognize the S-0Yiet Union to demonstrate its independence 
from Argentina, a journalist tapped a source in the Soviet 
embassy in Washington who claimed no official word had been 
received from La Paz. When the State Department weighed 
3
New York Times,. 20 June 1944, 3; 15 Nov. 1952j 4. 
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its options concerning recognition, a Time story on its 
dilemma almost certainly required contacts within the 
departme~t. A description of the efforts, concerns, and 
even moods of the head of the Bolivian mission in 
Washington required inside information from a source in the 
. . 4 
m1ss1on. 
During the sexenio, Juan Per6n accused Spruille Braden 
of writing a letter calling him a menace and comparing him 
to Al Capone. Journalists quoted American diplomats in 
Buenos Aires, who expressed concern as to how Argentina had 
come to know of such a letter, and State Department 
sources, who said no such letter could be found in the 
files in Washington. Later, when the Reconstruction Finance 
Corportation and Bolivian tin producers reached an interim 
agreement, an unnamed source described as an RFC spokesman 
5 commented extensively on the pact. 
On at least three occasions, inside sources helped 
monitor the status of the United States ambassador in 
Boliva, Irving Florman. Only a source within the United 
. 
States ·embassy in Bolivia could likely have supplied 
informatiq,n on the activist ambassador's habits including a 
direct quote of a sharp rebuff to an aid who was trying to 
be helpful on a matter of dress. An embassy source may have 
4New York Times, 25 Dec. 1943, 7; 31 Dec. 1943, 3; Time, 
3 Jan. 1944, 29; 10 Jan. 1944, 39. 
5 New York Times, 4 Aug. 1949, 9; 21 April 1951, 23. 
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been responsible for another sharp statement during 
r 
negotiations with tin producers, though the possibilities 
concerning sources were greater on that occasion. After a 
trip by Florman to Washington, a news story described 
•testy" relations between Florman and the state Department 
and included such inside information as the fact that the 
ambassador had signed a letter of resignation while in 
Washington. 6 
Just after the April revolution, a source specifically 
identified as a Bolivian embassy official in Washington 
expressed to a reporter the opinion that his country no 
long~r had claim on tin ore that had been waiting in 
Chilean and Peruvian ports for further shipment at the time 
the revolution took place. The followJng year, after 
fighting between the Bolivian government and the Bolivian 
Socialist Falange, the Chilean foreign ministry in Santiago 
told a reporter that the revolt had been supressea. 7 
. . 
UNIDENTIFIABLE SOURCES 
' 
More often than not, a source cannot be placed within a 
particular department or agency. Sources used by reporter 
Felix Belair, Jr., in a 1,200-word story a few days after 
nationalization illustrate the range of uncertainty in 
6Time, 6 Nov. 1950, 38; 17 Sept. 1951, 46. 
7wall Street Journal, 15 April 1952, 3; New York Times, 
10 Nov. 1953, 5. 
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placing sources. Belair reported that the State Department 
had told the Bolivian government it would be wise to settle 
with the former mine owners quickly. Since Belair was 
reporting from Washington,. his source was either in the 
State Department or the Bolivian embassy. Other sources 
cannot be narrowed down as closely. For example "Federal 
officials• and •officials who know most about the 
conditions under which the ore is mined• expected a drop in 
tin production. "Other government offficials• comment on 
the likelihood that compensation will be paid. Belair gives 
no source when he says it ~is believed• that American and 
Canadian engineers will not stay long in Bolivia or that 
the Bolivians might exhaust higher grade ore to turn a fast 
profit while ignoring common grades. 8 
Journalists went far afield to record interpretations of 
the 1943 coup. An Argentine "statesman" told one reporter 
that Bolivia was coming more into the sphere of influence 
' 
of Argentina as a result of the revolution. At year's end, 
an •official source• in Montevideo leaked word to the 
Associated Press that Argentina would shortly -- or already 
had -- recognized the new Bolivian government. When the 
United States announced in January 1944 that it would not 
recognize the Villarroel government, one press report used 
diplomatic sources that could have been American or 
1. 8New York Times, 5 Nov. 1952, 9. 
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British: "American officials have been discussing such a 
possibility (economic action against Argentina) with 
British representatives in view of Britain's economic 
interest in Argentina." 9 
Later in the year, reporters again used sources which 
were likely to be diplomatic but which were impossible to 
identify by specific nationalities. The State Department or 
any one of twenty foreign offices, perhaps several, might 
have been the source of a Time story that reported American 
recognition of Villarroel at long last: • .•• Great Britain 
and 29 Latin American Governments·promptly followed suit, 
for nearly all of them had been pressing the U.S. for this 
action for some months." After an attempted coup later in 
the year, the United Press reported that the situation in 
Bolivia was tense and that South American embassies were 
sheltering refugees. •niplomatic circles" were cited as the 
source of the information and were probably located in 
Santiago, where the report originated. 10 
The pattern of using numerous, widespread sources 
contihues into the later periods. When MNR forces 
challenged the Bolivian government in 1949, the Bolivian 
ambassador in Buenos Aires called on the Argentine foreign 
9New York Times, 26 Dec. 1943, 4E; 31 Dec. 1943, 3; 25 Jan. 1944, 1, 11. · 
lOTime, 3 July 1944, 20; New York Times, 24 Nov. 1944, 3. 
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minister and demanded to know why an MNR leader supposedly 
in exile in Argentina had led military forces in Bolivia. 
·, 
The press obtained at least an outline of the conversation. 
Later, negotiations over tin prices resulted in an article 
in which not only the specific positions of the negotiators 
were stated, but the overall positions and the motives of 
the American side were included. The source or sources 
might have been any o~ the parties, though an American 
source seems more likely. 11 
The followinJ year, a newsmagazine described not only 
the differences between Bolivian Ambassador Ricardo 
Martinez Vargas and RFC Administrator w. Stuart Symington, 
but also the differences between the RFC and State 
Department: 
In a series of blunt sessions with the State 
Department, Symington stuck to one principle: if 
the State Department wanted to bolster the 
Bolivian economy, it should get a foreign aid 
appropriation from Congress. It had no 
right to expect him to exact an 12 
artificial subsidy from u.s. consumers. 
Insider information is evident, especially since the 
tone of the private negotiations are described. The 
presence of the RFC in bpth sets of discussions suggests an 
RFC source. Symington himself is a likely source; he 
planned to seek a Senate seat and had an interest in 
11Time, 12 Sept. 1949, 42; 23 Jan. 1950, 25. 
I 
12Time,, 30 July 1951, 75. 
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appearing to be on the side of the American public. On the 
other hand, the information could have been gathered from 
state Department and Bolivian sources or, more likely, a 
combination of sources in Washington where the negotiations 
took place. 
In the days and months following the April revolution, 
other articles used sources that can be partially 
identified. As the fighting ended, the United Press 
reported, "Authoritative sources said Gen. Hugo Ballivian 
had taken refuge in a foreign embassy, but its identity was 
not disclosed.n The sources were probably diplomats in La 
Paz, where the story origniated, who were likely to know 
what was happening within embassies. Later, Time quoted a 
source who felt Bolivia would be safe from the right for at 
least a year, but faced a danger from the left. •There is a 
time bomb in that cabinet, and his name is Juan Lechin.• 
The source was identified only as a diplomat. In June 1953 
when Victor Andrade announced the agreement with the 
Patino mines, the press reported the expectation that 
similar agreement would be signed with the former owners of 
the Aramayo and Hochschild companies. "Officials" knew of 
A I I t t I 'th 13 no mer1can 1nves mens 1n e1 er company. 
In this last example, uncertainty about the source is 
13New York Times, 13 April 1952, 11; Time, 15 Dec. 1952, 
42; New York Times, 13 June 1953, 3; Wall Street Journal, 
13 June 1953, 7. 
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somewhat greater than other examples that have appeared in 
" 
this chapter. Concerning the future agreements, the news 
article reads, " ••• similar arrangements are expected* to 
be signed ••• " One might ask who is doing the expecting. 
The answer presumably is the source or sources who spoke 
only on the condition that they no~ be identified. There 
are two dangers in drawing conclusions from a passage of 
this nature. The first is the possibility that too much is 
read into what may simply be sloppy writing. The other is 
that the reporter may be expressing what he believes to be 
true rather than the beliefs or expectations of actual 
sources. While it would be unwise to base an argument a 
single passage of this nature, a pattern of such usage by 
reputable news organizations does support an argument that 
a relationship exists between reporters and certain types 
of sources. 
In fact, such exampl~s are numerous. A June 1941 cabinet 
under Pefiaranda that included Paz Estenssoro "is 
considered" a political innovation. A mon·th later some 
members were purged because the Nazis •are reported" to 
have convinced some Army officers that they were 
invincible. •rnformal expressions of opinion• in Washington 
saw no real danger to the progress of the Allied war effort 
when Villarroel took power. When the United States warned 
*The emphasis is mine. 
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exporters to stay in touch with exchange and import 
restrictions concerning Bolivia, •Many interpreted it" as a 
signal to exporters to be alert for impending restrictions 
by the Bolivians. When MNR members of the Villarroel 
cabinet departed, "It is believed possible" that the 
changes resulted from talks aimed at getting recognition. 
Later, Andrade's appointment as foreign minister (for a 
short time, it turned~) rather than as ambassador to the 
United States "was somewhat of a surprise." After 
Villarroel's death, most South American countries "were 
d " t I th t I kl 14 expecte o recognize e new governm~n qu1c y. 
When President Enrique Hertzog claimed that a coaliton 
existed between the MNR and the Partido de la Izquierda 
Revolucionario, reporter Milton Bracker in La Paz alluded 
to unspecific sources twice within one passage: 
The MNR -- which definitely is neo-fascist in 
pattern and is believed* to be directed from 
Argentina by the exiled Victor Paz Estenssoro, a 
crony of assassinated President Villaroel (sic) --
( is backed here by Juan Lechln, regarded by 15 ~ many* as potentially the country's worst demagogue. 
~ 
After a general strike in 1950, "It was fearea• 
casqalties would double. After the anti-MNR coup the next 
spring, "interpreters of the situation" in Buenos Aires saw 
*The emphasis is mine. 
14New York Times, 14 June 1941, 3; 20 July 1941, 1; 21 
Dec. 1943, 11; 14 Jan. 1944, 1, 6; 12 Feb. 1944, 7; 8 .Aug. 
1944, 5; 23 July 1946, 12. 
15New York Times, 21 Nov. 1948, 25. 
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the danger of an interuption of the flow of tin, further 
unrest, and bloody revolution. Despite an Indian festival 
in the days that follow,a, "it was doubted" that the MNR 
' 
...... ____ _ 
had given up preparations for violent protests. Reporter 
Foster Hailey described three explanations that "have been 
put forward" to account for post~coup events. When 
negotiations over tin prices began with the new government, 
the Associated Press reported, 0 0fficial circles seem to 
feel" results would be favorable. 16 
In the Associated Press's second-day story on the April 
•./ 
revolution, •roundabout advices" indicated (incorrectly) 
that Ballivian's forces were getting the upper hand. In 
Rio de Janeiro, "official circles were said to be deeply 
concerned" over implications of the revolt to plans to 
develop Bolivian petroleum. A few months later, the MNR 
commission studying the nationalization of the tin 
companies was on the verge of issuing a report which •was 
understood" to recommend compensation for investments and 
equipment but not for underground ore. A few days later the 
United Press said "it was reported" the government might 
seize the mines to before the official date to prevent 
. 
sabotage, and it cited "informed sources" studying the 
16New York Times, 20 May 1950, 5: ~os Angeles Times, 17 
May 1951, l; New York Times, 21 May 1951, 15; 22 May 1951, 
14; 30 June 1951, 23. 
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possibility of ~reezing the accounts of the.big three mine 
t . 17 opera ions. 
BACKGROUND SOURCES 
' 
Occasionally, reports in the press did not list or imply 
any source whatsoever. Some ~.nformation in such reports, 
such as the unusual altitude of the Bolivian capital, could 
have been had with no expert contacts. Detailed background 
information in some reports may seem to require expert 
contacts when, in fact, they are simply rewrites of 
previous reports. Felix Belair, Jr., for example, examined 
the past tin-price negotiations in some detail in a 1952 
article. All the material in the background section of his 
report, however, was available from his newspaper's earlier 
stories, and Belair almost certainly had a clip file. 18 
There is another source of information which does not 
require a reporter to go directly to the parties involved 
in the events he is covering. He can get information 
directly from other journalists; an American writer, for 
example, may confer with Bolivian journalists. Because the 
territory of correspondents in south American often covers 
more than one country, a certain reliance on local 
,0 
journalists can be expected. Complete dependence by the 
1710s Angeles Times, 11 April 1952, 8; New York Times, 
12 April 1952, 1, 4: Wall street Journal, 4 Oct. 1952, 3: 
New York Times, 7 Oct. 1952, 41. 
18New York Times, 5 Nov. 1952, 9. 
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major news organizations on Bolivian journalists is 
unlikely, however. so again, while any one example is an 
unreliable proof of contact between reporters and the 
participants in an event, a sustained pattern does strongly 
support that some contact did take place. 
"" 
In 1946, Time not only reported the statements of Jose 
Antonio Arze, leader of the Partido de la Izquierda 
Revolucionario but declared that he "well knows that 
Bolivian Socialists can never nationalize and operate the 
tin mines so long as all the smelters are abroaa.• Later in 
the sexenio, when the United States suspended tin 
purchases, a press report provided unattributed analysis: 
" ..• the Government's action is directed at Great Britain, 
Belgium, Holland, Bolivia and other tin producing countries 
of the Communist areas." 19 
In_the days following the MNR takeover, the United Press 
analyzed the new go.vernment' s stake in arguing for tin 
prices, possibly indicating an expert diplomatic or 
business source. An Associated Press report at the time of 
recognition declared that reports of the coming recognition 
., 
ftapparently prompted" the Bolivians to release tin at 
Arica, Chile, for shipment. A day later, the wire setvice 
reported without attribution: "The United States had 
delayed recognition mainly because of the worry over what 
19Time, 2 Sept. 1946, 31; New York Times, 7 March 1951, 
1. 
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• 
the new government might do about Bolivia's stategic tin 
resources.• More expert sources are apparently behind an 
Associated Press report on tin price -negotiations 
·originating in Washington which stated Andrade was hoping 
to obtain at least a one-year contract at $1.21 1/2 cents a 
pound, a price better than the going rate. 20 
In 1953, as the MNR prepared for a party conference, a 
news story reported without attribution that communist 
elements were complaining that "the original aims of the 
Movement have been betrayed to 'imperialism.'" When the MNR 
government reached agreement with the old mine owners and 
the United States on wolfram purchases, journalists 
-
speculated in print that the development might lead to new 
purchases of tin by the United States. A few weeks later, a 
Wall street Journal report indicated without attribution 
that a final settlement between the former mine owners and 
the Bolivian government was likely to take a long time due 
to a desire for a fair price that the government could 
afford. Finally, following the MNR's land reform decree, 
Time reported the expert observation that continued 
subsistance farming might leave the country more dependent 
than ever on imported fooa. 21 
20New York Times, 16 April 1952, 8; 2 June 1952, 2; 3 
June 1952, 101 Wall Street Journal, 7 Aug. 1952, 2. 
21 . 
New York Times, 1 Feb. 1953, 27; Wall Street Journal, 
4 May 1953, 3; 27 May 1953, 10; Time, 17 Aug. 1953, 38. 
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UNTAPPED SOURCES 
The news arttqles cited here demonstrate widespread 
contacts between reporters and participants and expert 
sources not only in Washington b11t in Rio de Janeiro, 
Buenos Aires, Santiago, and especially La Paz. There were, 
however, two potential sources of information that 
journalists left untapped. Prior to 1951, American 
reporters made virtually no contacts with MNR sources while 
the party was out of p,Jwer. More surprising, in reporl:ing 
the events concerning Bolivia, they used virtually no 
sources connected to the United States Congress, a body 
Reston specifically identifies as one that frequently 
exchanges information with journalists for the mutual 
benefit of both groups. 
..,,;:,,:;' 
Reports on the MNR while it was out of power appear to 
have been based on information supplied by its opponents. 
In an advance story on the 1951 election, for example, New 
York Times correspondent Herbert L. Matthews described Paz 
Est.enssoro as '!-0ne. of the most attractive and -- from what 
they say in La Paz -- one of the most sinister figures in 
Latin America .•• " Matthews includes a few lines on the 
candidate's "model" family, but nothing that would not be 
readily available without contacting MNR souces, given Paz· 
Estenssoro's previous prominence. Then he again 
I 
I 
demonstrates his information is coming from sources far 
away from the exiled candidate: •senor Paz Estenssoro is 
79 · ,~· 
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~. 
rated in Bolivia* as a killer who bears in his heart a 
spirit of hate and vengence.• MNR sources~are nowhere 
quoted. 22 
News articles focused on Paz Estenssoro as early as 
1941. Police sources are cited that year following his 
arrest in connection with a plot to smuggle Nazi propaganda 
into Bolivia, but neiter Paz Estenssoro nor a 
representative for him is quoted. Even as he took power 
with Villarroel thirty months later, one dispatch appeared 
to be based on information provided by opponents,. who 
described the MNR as "accused of affiliation with Germanic 
elements." When Villarroel died, Time correspondent Frank 
Norris traveled from Buenos Aires to La Paz with returning 
exiles, but apparently no American journalists kept 
contacts with the new exiles traveling in the other 
d . t· 23 1rec 10n • 
. Through most of the sexenio, reporters relied upon 
government and police sources -- and thus opponents of the 
MNR. No MNR contacts were made when twenty party leaders 
were rounded up for the attack on the home of the interior 
minister in 1948. When nine MNR deputies were elected in 
1949, the party was described as •the totalitarian-type 
*The emphasis is mine. 
22New York Times, 15 April 1951, 34. · 
23New York Times, 21 July 1941, l; Los Angeles Times, 21 
Dec. 1943, 2; Time, 5 August 1946, 47. 
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party whose leaders were driven underground with the 
lynching of Dictator-President Gualberto Villarroel in 
1946 ••. • There is no sign of contact with the MNR, while 
President Enrique Hertzog was quoted directly. The next 
year, the government declared a siege allegedly to head off 
an MNR revolt, and again party contacts were missing. A few 
months later, President Mamerto Urriolagotia declared that 
•communists and extreme rightists• had joined forces to 
overthrow the government. Again, there was no attempt to 
contact any of the parties that were the focus of the 
·a t' attack. 24 pres1 en s 
These failures of the news organizations resulted at 
times from lack of access to groups whose members were in 
hiding, but on other occasions they reflect laziness or at 
best a failure to staff the Bolivian story sufficiently 
enough to cover events as they unfolded in more than one 
place. At the time of Matthews story, for example, Paz 
Estens.soro was living openly in Buenos Aires. It is very 
likely that another Times correspondent could have 
contacted him or that Matthews could have contacted MNR 
campaigners in t~e Bolivian capital. It was not until later 
in the 1951 campaign that the MNR is finally quoted from 
exile, and contact again stops within a few days of the 
coup that prevented Paz Estenssoro from taking office. 
24 · New York Times, 25 Sept. 1948, 30; Time, 16 May 1949, 
38; New York Times, 15 Jan. 1950, 23: 10 April 1950, ~ 
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Whatever the reason, the press did not provide balanced 
coverage of the MNR as a party out of power. 
Lack of access was not a factor with the United States 
......... 
Congress. To some extent, the lack of contact with Congress 
concerning policy toward Bolivia reflects the fact that 
Congress did not take a leading role in shaping these 
policies. Senator George D. Aiken admits there was little 
examination of "the Bolivian situation and the forces which 
brought the MNR into beings prior to 1952. Despite the fact 
that the MNR was accused of communist connections shortly 
before it came to power, Senator Joseph McCarthy apparently 
never took an interest in the country. Finally, the 
Eisenhower administration, using existing legislation to 
grant emergency aid, had established its working 
relationship with the Bolivian government before Congress 
25 was ever called upon to act. 
Still, Congress was involved in relations with Bolivia, 
and opportunity for press contacts did exist, especially 
just before the April revolution. Senator Lyndon B. Johnson 
was chairman of the Senate Preparedness Subcommittee, the 
body that ensured that the United States had adequate 
supplies of materials suchaa3 tin. In that capacity,. 
Johnson had a heated argument with Bolivian tin barons in 
the days before the MNR seized power, and the exchange was 
25
vfctor Andrade, Bolivia: Problems and Promise 
(Washington: 1956), 3. 
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reported in.the Bolivian press. The New York Times reported 
that Johnson had recommended to the Reconstruction Finance 
,, 
Corporation that the United States pay no more for Bolivian 
tin than it did for British tin, but it cited Bolivian tin 
industry sources rather than congressional sources. Later, 
during negotiations over compensation for the expropriated 
mines, Senator Millard Tydings represented some of the 
· 26 foreign stockholders. 
The same pattern appears earlier. In 1947, Sen. Owen 
Brewster attacked Spruille Braden for his policy toward 
South America, but journalists reported only his broadcast 
.. "-
remarks; they did not use congressional sources. In 1951, 
the Preparedness Subcommittee accused Bolivia of gouging 
and urged the closing of world markets and the convening of 
an international conference. •Government sources• cited on 
that occassion might have been congressional, but 
references to the sounding out of other governments 
indicates a State Department source more likely than not. 
RFC Administrator W. Stuart Symington also testified before 
the subcommittee, but the news report was based strictly on 
the testimony, not on congresssional sources. 27 r 
26James Dunkerley, Rebellion in the Veins: Political 
Struggle ·in Bolivia 1952-82 (London: 1984), 2; New York 
Times, 4 April 1952, 38; The American Republics, vol. 4 of 
Foreign Relations of the United States 1952-1954 
(Washington: 1983), 539. 
27
~w York Times, 2 June 1947, 18; 5 March 1951, 1, 16; 
25 July .1951, 12. 
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Shortly after the April revolution, the New York Times 
reported that eight days prior to the MNR revolt Senator 
Dennis Chavez had warned the revolt was imminent. Since the 
press did not report Chavez's speech when it took place, it 
is possible that the senator's administrative assistant or 
another congressional source alerted a reporter to its 
content. It is as likely, though, that such information 
came from State Department sources since State Department 
concerns are also contained in the article. Later, the 
press reported the subcommittee commendation of the 
government's handling of negotiations with Bolivia, but the 
report simply quotes the subcommittee's public report; it 
does not go to congressional sources for elaboration or 
. t t t. 28 1n erpre a 10n. 
• 
Finally, a visit by the Joint Banking and Currency 
Committee to Bolivia coincided with a· domestic challenge to 
Paz Estenssoro in November 1953. The United Press account 
of the trip contains no information to suggest the use of 
congressional sources. Time, one the other hand, described 
tal~s between Paz Estenssoro and Sen. Homer Capehart using 
enough anecdotes to suggest considerable inside 
information., and congressional sources seem likely29 
A single likely use of congressional sources and a few 
28New 
29New 
47. 
... 
York Times, 20 April 1952, III-8; 17 July_ 
York Times, 10 Nov.~1953, 5; Time, 23 Nov. 
_ . .,._ 
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possible uses do not establish the pattern needed to 
support Reston's notions about the Congress as a mechanism 
' 
of press influence in foreign policy. Neither, however, 
does it discredit his thesis; it only points out that it 
does not apply in all cases and suggests influence is 
reduced in cases that are not prominent in the American 
public's conscience. The use of diplomatic sources as a 
means of influence supports Reston's claim of cooperative 
relationships between reporters and diplomats. Though gaps 
appear, a relatonship with these types of sources appears 
more widespread geog~aphically than Reston suggests. 
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CHAPTER V. EXECUTIVES AND THE PRESS 
When Milton Eisenhower toured Latin America in 1953, he 
observed the press coverage the mission drew. The 
newspapers of all cen of the nations he visited followed 
the trip in detail and displayed it prominently. "The only 
press that gave scant coverage," he complained, "was our 
own.• Milton Eisenhower's sense of disappointment with 
press inadequacy reflected a widespread discontent among 
the members of the American and Bolivian executive branches 
. th f f th A ' l 1n e per ormance o e mer1can press • 
.,. 
VICTOR ANDRADE 
Among the Bolivians, Victor Andrade had extensive 
exposure to the press during his tenures as ambassador to 
the United States under Gualberto Villarroel and in the 
years following the 1952 revolution, exposure that was 
enhanced by the fact he had spoken English fluently and 
with a good accent from an early age. The ambassador 
enjoyed good relations with the press. Andrade himself 
claimed the support of numerous journalists: Arthur 
Sulzberger, Herbert Matth~ws, and Bill Lawrence of the New 
York Times; Sam Kauffman of the Washington Evening star; 
1Milton Eisenhower, The Wine Is Bitter: The United 
States and Latin America (Garden City, N.Y.: 1963), 189. 
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and columnists Joseph and Steward Alsop, Marquis Childs, 
Arthur Krock, Drew Pearson, and Walter Lippmann. In fact, 
Andrade had been a journalist himself in Bolivia, directing 
a weekly magazine, variedades, and contributing to La 
2 Razon, a daily newspaper in La Paz. 
Two conferences during the Villarroel years expanded 
Andrade's contact with American journalists. In April 1944, 
·'.C\ 
the International Labor Office held a world confere11c~ in 
Philadelphia. Andrade traveled between Washington and 
Philadelphia for weeks meeting with State Department 
officials, liberal groups, labor groups, and the Washington 
Press corps. He hoped his discussions would portray the 
Villarroel government as a genuine popular movement which 
sought power for those who put Bolivia's interests first, 
•, 
not for those who sought to make it "a servant of 
international economics." 3 
The following spring, Andrade held the presidency of one 
of the committees at the United Nations Charter Conference 
in San Francisco. In this capacity he made speeches and 
held news conferences for the world press. Aware that 
members of the press worked under considerable pressure 
during the busy, important conference, Andrade kept 
reporters posted on the likely magnitude of each of his 
2victor Andrade, My Missions for Revolutionary Bolivia 
(Pittsburgh: 1976), xii, 140, s. 
3Andrade, Missions, 27-28. 
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briefings. The wire services and the large newspapers 
appreciated the courtesy, he felt. Andrade described his 
concerns:-/"A representative of a great power could 
occasionally afford the luxury of being indescrete and 
hostile; the representative of a small country had to 
conduct himself just so.• 4 
When he returned to Washington in 1952, Andrade 
contacted "old friends from Time• and was able to arrange a 
lunch with two of the magazine's editors for Latin America. 
Later in the year, he took advantage of the attention which 
the New York Times gave to the nationalization of the tin 
mines. A November 3 editorial had argued that the United 
States should not intervene to undo Bolivia's action and 
should only be concerned with American interests. Andrade 
used the mild editorial as a pretext to write a letter 
commenting on charges that had been reported in the 
newspaper, particularly those of a group of mine engineers 
who denounced nationalization ifi mid November. 5 
The significant coverage the New York Times gave to the 
nationalization question, however, was an exception to the 
rule. American journalists paid little attention to 
Bolivia, and Andrade knew it. Even when he claimed the 
support of newspaper executives and columnists, he 
4Andrade, Missions, 82-84. 
5Andrade, Missio~@, 135: New York Times, 28 Nov. 52, 24. 
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acknowledged the •1irnited space that these newsmen gave to 
Latin American affairs." In describing his relations with 
the press during the conferences of 1944 and 1945, Andrade 
was uncharacteristically silent on anecdotes and details. 
His memoirs are full of such particulars -- but not in 
reference to the press. In relating the events in 
Philadelphia and San Francisco, the ambassador did not 
mention a single journalist by name. 
Andrade's description of his meeting with Fran: !in 
Roosevelt mentions that they were photographed and 
questioned by reporters, but Andrade does not bother to say 
what was asked, who the reporters were, or what 
organizations they.represented. He did not describe what, 
if anything, was written. Andrade mentioned in passing that 
a "journalist friend" brought him news of a revolt in Oruro 
in November 1944. He brushed it off, though: •Because I had 
already received direct reports, that was not news to me.• 
Around the time of nationalization, Andrade did report that 
"some friends in the press" brought him a manuscript of a 
study being prepared for the big three mine owners to 
demonstrate communist penetration of Bolivia. The report, 
however, was never published, and the incident was of no 
consequence. 6 
While Andrade remained on good terms with the press, his 
6Andrade, Missions, 53, 48, 135-36. 
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writings and speeches indicate that what the media might 
have done was far more important than what they actually 
did. oriring a speech to the Pan American Women's 
Association in November 1952, Andrade called on the press 
to examine the Bolivian situation carefully. It never did. 
His disappointment in its performance appears vividly in 
his memoirs where he delivered an oblique critique of the 
news media by complimenting Americans on their ability to 
get information on Latin America through their civic and 
religious groups. The mass media, he wrote, are "often 
controlled by large corporations and {are) often obliged to 
filter the news through the screen of their interests and 
'b'l't' n? respons1 1 1 1es. 
EISENHOWER ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS 
The Bolivian ambassador's most prominent golf partner 
shared a working knowlegde of the press and respected its 
place in the American constitutional system. President 
Dwight D. Eisenhower took pride in his practices of holding 
a weekly press conference and of allowing, for the first 
time, verbatim transcripts of press conferences. In 1954, 
he praised the independence of the press before a meeting 
of the American Newspaper Publishers Association. "A goodly 
portion of the Washington Press corps is of a stature to 
7Andrade, Bolivia: Problems and Promise (Washington: 
1956), 15; Andrade, Missions, 141. 
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command respect;" he later wrote, wseveral became my 
friends, not mere faces in the crowd.w A long-time friend 
was William Robinson of the New York Herald Tribune. In 
-April 1952, Robinson had even delivered the personal letter 
from General Eisenhower to Milton Eisenhower which led the 
latter to believe that his brother might, in fact, seek the 
presidency. Robinson had been a member of General 
Eisenhower's personal advisory group that spring. 8 
While the president's respect for the press as an 
institution was genuine, he found plenty to criticize. In 
particular, he believed it to be too sensational. Asked to 
repudiate Joseph McCarthy during the 1952 campaign, General 
Eisenhower made the charge by implication: "It is a sorry 
mess; at times one feels like hanging his head in shame 
when he reads some of the unreasoned, vicious outbursts of 
demagoguery that appear in our public prints.• Two years 
later, the president told the ANPA audience that the press 
was too sensational. 9 
~ 
The same charge came upon his return from Latin America 
in 1960 when he described the great enthusiasm his trip had 
generated: 
8nwight Eisenhower, Mandate for Change (Garden City, 
N.Y.: 1963), 232; Dwight Eisenhower, Peace with Justice 
(New York: 1961), 66-78; Milton Eisenhower, The President 
Is Calling (Garden_City, N.Y.: 1974), 243-47. 
9charles Alexander, Holdins the Line (Bloomington, Ind., 
and London: 1975), -55. 
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Two or three insignificant exceptions to this 
may have made a headline, but they were only minor 
incidents, lost in the massed welcome ••.• 
Newspapers, magazines, all means of communication 
should accept the responsib~lity not merely of 
transmitting spectacular news, but of helping • 
build the know~edge on which 10 
co-operative action may flourish. 
During the ANPA address, the president specifical1j 
commented on foreign news coverage citing a newspaper 
industry study that indicated only four columns a day were 
devoted to foreign news. That space was inadequate, he 
said, to describe all the important events of the world. He 
also worried about content: •very little of the news had to 
do with the man in the street, or with his social, 
educational, cultural, civic, and religious life and 
history." These, he said, were vital to th~ understanding 
of a nation. 
President Eisenhower also reacted to charges against him 
made by the press. He was particularly defensive about 
reports of his reading habits; he was alleged to never read 
reports more than a page long, and, as Reston later 
demonstrated, some felt he did not closely read newspapers. 
'~,', 
Eisenhower himself confirmed that he had once told 
reporters he never read newspapers, but claimed he had not 
been serious. He wrote that he read "the better part of two 
newspapers" before business most mornings during his 
presidency. He said he regularly read the work of Arthur 
. ' 
100. Eisenhower, Peace, 241, 246. 
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Krock, Rosco Drummond, Larry Burd, Robert Donovan, and
 
David Lawrence in addition to some of his consistent 
critics such as Marquis Childs, Kenneth Crawford and W
alter 
Lippmann. While he avoided columnists who, in his view
, 
•consistently strayed too far from the facts,• he read
 the 
press enough to pass judgment, for example, on the coverage 
of the 1954 election. 11 
While Dwight Eisenhower's statements show substantial 
defensiveness, there is evidence to suggest that he wa
s 
more familiar with newspapers than critics suggested. 
While 
still in Abilene, Kansas, around 1910, he began reading
 
major newspapers regularly, and in the years between World 
War II and his election 1 he frequently received clippi
ngs 
and cartoons through an informal clip service operated
 by 
his friends and subordinates.
12 
If there is an area where President Eisenhower's 
knowledge -- and perhaps interest -- is deficient, it 
is 
South America. Except in reference to his 1960 Latin 
American tour, on which he did not visit Bolivia, 
Eisenhower said almost nothing about South America in 
his 
11steven Ambrose, Ike's s ies: Eisenhower and the 
Espionage Estabishment (Garden·City, N.Y.: 1981, 256; n. 
Eisenhower, Mandate, 233, 439. 
12steven Ambrose, Soldier, General of the.Armx, 
President-elect 1890-1952, vol. 1 of Eisenhower (New York: 
1983), 37: Blanche Wiesen Cook, The Declassified 
Eisenhower: A Divided Legacy (Garden City, N.Y.: 1981), · 
70-71. 
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own writings. Likewise, his biographers barely mention the 
continent. One, in fact, brings up South America in a 
single footnote in one of his major works only to 
demonstrate what he sees as the president's dismal 
understanding of the Third World and the role of the United 
t . . t 13 sates 1n 1 • 
secretary of state John Foster Dulles, like his boss, 
paid little attention to South America during his years in 
power. His main interest in the region came earlier, before 
and shortly after World War I. In 1926, for example, he was 
involved when Lehman Brothers arranged a loan to the 
t f l t I 14 governmen o Bo 1v1a. 
In his extensive writings, however, south America barely 
exists. In one of his two books he praised the Rio Pact of 
1947 because he felt it helped to correct an impression 
that the Monroe Doctrine placed other American nations in 
an inferior status to the United States. He also noted that 
the soviet Union had made no major efforts in Latin America 
but that they did spread propaganda. With the spread of 
fascism and the trend away from representative democracy in 
the 1940s, he worried that the Soviets might make gains if 
they tried aggressively. He did not worry much, though; he 
13steven Ambrose, Rise to Globalism: American Forei~n Policy since 1938 (London: 1971), 266(n). 
14 
· Ronald Pruessen, John Foster Dulles: The Road to Power (New York: 1982), 67-68. 
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covered the region in two pages. Just over a month after 
the MNR siezed power in the April revolution, Dulles wrote 
an article for Life in which he discussed the danger of 
communist advances. A year earlier, the MNR had been 
supported by Bolivian communists in the presidential 
election, but Dulles ignored the situation completely in 
h . t· 1 15 1s ar 1c e. 
Dulles's writings, while extensive, offer few clues as 
to the sources he used, and it is difficult to determine 
from them if he read the press extensively. His books 
contain virtually no source notes, and he rarely mentioned 
opponents by name, thus eliminating the need to document 
even his formal works. !n his first book, for example, he 
wrote, "There is a feeling that mankind is impotent to 
;,,, accomplish a result which is universally desired.• Who had 
this feeling, and where did Dulles learn it? He never said. 
Throughout his work, he preferred the general over the 
'·' 
\) 
specific, the theoretical over the practical, and \ 
institutions over individuals. When he did quote a source, 
,'·i 
I ,~-/ 
it was usually from Eighteenth Century political theory, 
such as the Federalist Papers. 16 
15 John Foster Dulles, War or Peace (New York: 1950), 94, 
150-51; John Foster Dulles, "A Policy of Boldness,• Life, 
19 May 1952, 146-60. 
16John Foster Dulles, War, Peace and Chanse (New York 
and London: 1939), 3; for a list of the works of Dulle·s, 
see Michael Gubin, John Foster Dulles: A Statesman and his 
Times (New York and London: 1972), 384, 388-95. 
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While Dulles's writing said little about how he felt 
toward the press, his work in popular magazines such as 
Life and the New York Ti~es Magazine did suggest he felt 
the American public had influence in foreign policy. He 
felt it was important that the public understand America's 
position in the world and the dangers to its way of life. 
Very devoted to democratic principles, Dulles apparently 
took the notion of an informed electorate exercising power 
through the ballot very seriously. 
~While Dulles may not have relied on the press as source 
material for his work, he did develop a working 
relationship with a number of news organizations. During 
World War II, he learned public relations techniques in 
connection with his work for the Federal Council of 
Churches, work which was covered by Time, Lif~, and 
Newsweek. He met Arthur Sulzberger of the New York Times in 
1941 and began developing ties with other key people on the 
newspaper the following year. His work for the Carnegie 
Endowdrnent for International Peace and the Rockefeller 
Foundation facilitated these contacts. He received 
favorable coverage from Henry Luce, a factor partly 
responsible for his prominence by 1944. 17 
As secretary of state, he encouraged contacts with the 
press. He favored a practice in which groups of 
-----·----
17 h Pruessen, Dulles, 193, 206, 222, 235 • 
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correspondents privately held dinners for public officials 
for the purpose of getting background information.
18 
One State Department official who, in accordance with 
his official duties, devoted much time to Latin America was 
John Moors Cabot, Assistant Secretary of State for Latin 
American Affairs under Dulles until early 1954~ Cabot's 
career had dealt primarily with the Americas since he 
served a Vice Consul in Peru in 1927. Like other people in 
the administration, Cabot had dealings with the press. On 
one occasion as assistant secretary, he answered questions 
about the region during a CBS Radio interview. Cabot 
supported the concept of a free press, but in an address at 
Columbia University he called upon the profession to oppose 
what he saw as an irresponsible minority within it. Thus 
his views on the press reinforce those of the rest of the 
d ' . t t' 19 a m1n1s ra 10n. 
ACADEMICS 
Executive branch contacts with the academic world went 
far beyond occasional public speeches. They were extensive 
enough that any substatial media influence on the academic 
community could have been· a)factor in administration 
policy. Before becoming president, Dwight Eisenhower had 
18 Bernard Cohen, The Press and Foreign Policy 
(Princeton: 1963), 29. 
19John Moors Cabot, Toward Our Common Destinx (Medford, 
Mass.: 1954), vi,_41-60, s. 
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been president of Columbia University. In 1946 he had 
argued for the continuation of the wartime relationship 
between military and civilian sectors, including 
universlties. On the Bolivian side, Victor Andrade spent 
part of the sexenio as a visiting professor in New York. 20 
Universities and individual faculty m~rnbers often worked 
with or even within the Eisenhower administration. 
President Eisenhower favored the presidential commission as 
a mechanism for this work. The influential President's 
Commission on National Goals of 1960 was an example. Henry 
M. Wriston, president of Brown University, chaired the 
commission, and other members included Clark Kerr, 
president of the University of California, and James R. 
Killian, a faculty member of the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology. Earlier, MIT physicist Jerome B. Wiesner had 
joined in an exam~nation of national defense issues as part 
of the National Security Panel of 1957. 21 
The academic community also participated in programs 
aimed at Bolivia. The University of ~ennessee worked 
through the Economic Cooperation Administration to help 
organize the School of Public Administration at San Andres 
University in La Paz. Robert J. Alexander, a faculty member 
at Rutgers University, joined the International Cooperation 
J / 
20 c. Alexander, 
21 l c. A exander, 
Holding, 290; Andrade, Missions, 127. 
Holding, 269-71, 227-28. 
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Administration, the ECA under an earlier name, and visited 
Bolivia in. 1957. On the eve of Milton Eisenhower's tour of 
Latin America in 1953, Brown's Dr. Wriston was among the 
guests at the private dinner President Eisenhower held for 
h t b "h 22 1s roe er. 
' . . . 
Milton Eisenhower, the president of Pennsylvania State 
University from 1950 to 1956, exercised greater influence 
on the administration's policies toward Bolivia than any 
other member of the academic community and, especially 
early_ in the first Eisenhower administration, more than any 
government official. Ambassador Andrade wrote, •The 
spectacle of the oppression of an entire nation by a bold, 
privileged minority, repelled him and made him one of the 
most important friends we have had.• 23 
e 
Milton Eisenhower had studied Latin American history. 
The title of his first book, The Wine Is Bitter, came from 
a phrase coined by Jose Marti. Eisenhower returned from 
the 1953 visit to Bolivia and other Latin American nations 
with the message that revolution in the region was 
inevitable. He saw a choice between a peaceful revolution 
-to oust "the oligarchists, the corrupt, the dictators" or a 
violent communist revolution. "The reform parties,• he told 
22Robert Alexander, The Bolivian National Revolution 
{New Brunswick, N.J.: 1958), x, 267; New York Times, 23 
June 1953, 25. 
23Andrade, Missions, 173. 
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his brother, specifically including the MNR, •desire to 
achieve far-reaching social ana- economic changes within a 
framework of freedom, justice and democratic 
I t't t• n24 ins 1 u ions. 
Milton Eisenhower clearly followed the press closely and 
had contact with journalists. He formed ideas about 
American public opinion, including a belief that his 
countrymen were generally sympathetic toward expropriation 
of prop<~rty by foreign governments offering compensation. 
In Dec~mber 1942 he had learned from journalists the extent 
of misinformation coming out of northern Africa. He counted 
Edward R. Murrow among his friends. Later he attributed the 
term "the treatment" -- a reference to Lyndon Johnson's 
style of aggressive coaxing -- to newspapermen. 25 
r~ Like officials of his brother's administration,(' 
Eisenhower believed an independent press served an 
important function in a democratic society. In The 
/ 
President Is Calling, one of his typically wordy chapter 
titles i) ·The greatest threat to tyranny and the greatest 
protection of freedom is truth." If the people, he wrote, 
"are to decide wisely on complex issues and among 
candidates for office, they must have a free flow of 
accurate and untainted information." That statement, more 
24M. Eisenhower, Wine, 14-20, xi, 319. 
25M. Eisenhower, Wine, 146; M. Eisenhower, President, 140, 137, 4 • 
• 
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than any other, reflects the belief in traditional press 
theory so widespr·ead within the Eisenhower 
d .. t t' 26 a m1n1s ra 10n .. 
' 
Milton Eisenhower knew that some tension between the 
president and the press is natural. Nonetheless, he was a 
tireless critic of the mass media, and most of his passing 
references to it were in some way negative. He told how a 
person could enter the White House without being seen by 
reporters and subjected to "embarrassing demands for 
statements." He took issue with a Time report that he 
helped persuade his brother to run for president. He 
contradicted press labels placed on Senator Robert Taft. He 
disagreed with the press contention that his brother was 
shaken by the "political slush fund• scandal involving 
Richard Nixon in 1952 and was troubled when what he 
believed were off-the-record comments on the matter ended 
up in print. Later, he complained that presidential 
commissions lost favor with the press in the 1960s and that 
the press tended to sensationalize parts of commission 
findings without properly reporting overall conclusions. 27 
Milton Eisenhower's was especially critical of the 
press, among others, in connection with the infamous 
relocation of Japanese-Americans during World War II. ·The 
26M. Eisenhower, President, 570. 
27M. Eisenhower, President, 571, xxi, 313, 244, 252, 
6-7. 
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mass media on the Coast were inflaming the people against 
the Japanese Americans,• he wrote. "Newspapers and radio 
stations were filled with stories of the roundup of 
Japanese and there were sensational reports of the 
mysterious activities in the Japanese community," he wrote. 
He cited specific broadcasts and named individual 
columnists, including Walter Lippmann, who he said joined 
the anti-Japanese-American bandwagon. Eisenhower concluded, 
"I believe to this day that most of the evacuation could 
have been avoided had not the false and inflaming 
statements been dinned into the people of the West Coast by 
irresponsible commentators and politicians.• Eisenhower's 
discomfort with his own role on the War Relocation Board 
may have been one source of his ill feelings toward the 
press. 28 
His criticism extended to press coverage of tatin 
America and of Bolivia specifically. A lack of literature 
in general existed on the post-war political situation in 
Latin America, Milton Eisenhower wrote. The press, in 
addition to business leaders and politicians, made false 
statements about Bolivian leaders, he wrote. 29 
28M. Eisenhower, President, 97-110, 124. 
29M. Eisenhower, Wine, S, 67-68. 
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A LIMITED IMPACT 
The substantial contact between the press and the people 
of the Eisenhower administration, both after January 1953 
and in the decades leading up to it, provide the potential 
for enormous press influence in the relations between the 
United States government and Bolivia's Movimiento 
Nacionalista Revolucionario. The potential of influence. 
through the academic community was also substantial, though 
it was limited by the scarcity of Bolivian specialists in 
colleges and university in the early 1950s. Most of the 
real influence flowed through one extraordinary member of 
the academic community, and with that exception of the 
president's brother, the potential for influence of the 
press through the academic community was no greater than 
through a number of other communities that affected the 
administration. Business leaders, for example, also sat on 
presidential commissions •. 
In any event, the potential of the press went largely 
unrealized for two reasons. First, the administration 
looked to the press to produce a nation of calm, 
enlightened citizens expert in all the problems and issues 
' __,I 
that faced their nation. While the administration's claims 
of sensationalism were often valid, administration figures 
were cool toward journalists because reporters could not 
produce the expert citizens that believers in traditional 
press theory expected, and administration leaders were firm 
103 
believers in traditional press theory. The friction was not 
severe, aut it was sufficient to be felt by men such as 
James Reston and to limit their influence. 
Far more important, American journalists paid little 
attention to Bolivia between coups. The country is small 
.... 
and poor, and it is located on a continent where even the 
most important countries receive relatively little 
attention in the American press. Editorials concerning the 
nation were few and usually shallow due to a lack of 
editors' exposure to the nation. Much the same applied to 
columns. News stories appeared in the New York Times often 
enough, but they were usually deep inside the newspapers 
and very brief. Some were literally fillers. Such coverage 
could not have had a long-term cumulative effect on the men 
who were later to make up the Eisenhower administration 
because it is unreasonable to assume that a general reader 
like Dwight Eisenhower -- or even one with general foreign 
policy interests like John Foster Dulles -- actually read 
any significant number of the articles. Government and 
academic experts on Latin American affairs such as John 
Moors Cabot possibly saw these articles, but the articles 
·' lacked the detail and depth to have a~y broad impact on 
their thinking. 
Instead, press impact on the Eisenhower administration 
policy toward Bolivia was exercised through the short-term 
mechanisms described in earlier chapters. All else is 
104 
superficial. Robert J. Alexander, for example, used the New 
York Times in his research on Bolivia, but his 
participation in the administration was brief and marginal. 
Besides, he used the newspaper mainly to check dates. 
Members of the Eisenhower administration were too 
suspicious of the press -- as Reston suggests -- and 
American press coverage of Bolivia was too sporatic and 
shallow for it to have had a significant long-term impact 
on relations between Bolivia and the United states. 30 
30R. Alexander, Revolution, 284, 286(n). 
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CHAPTER VI. CONCLUSIONS 
This study supports much of the thesis described by 
James Reston, but it demonstrates that his ideas do not 
cover all the means by which the press can influence 
foreign affairs or United States foreign policy. Reston 
spent his career as a daily journalist based in Washington; 
since his thoughts are largely founded on personal 
experience, it is not surprising that they involve the 
short-term influence and the influence exercised in the 
capital with which he was most familiar. 
The Bolivian experience strongly suggests that 
governwents do transmit messages through the press and that 
there is cooperation between reporters and diplomats. On 
the former point, the evidence demonstrates communication 
between governments through newspapers where official 
communication was slower or inappropriate. Bolivian 
governments' statements of their intentions upon taking 
power and the United States administration's announcement 
that it was consulting other goverments in connection with 
1943-44 recognition issue are strong examples of these two 
points. The evidence, however, suggests an even broader 
network of communications which includes participants who 
do not have access to diplomatic channels. Exiled leaders 
~ 
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outside Bolivia, opposition parties, tin-industry figures, 
and even disappointed followers of the MNR hiding in the 
hills above La Paz provide examples. 
There are numerous other examples of cooperation in 
Washington ~etween reporters and the personel of foreign 
embassies or of the State Department. These revealed, for 
example, the pressure on the United States to finally 
recognize Villarroel applied by British and Latin American 
governments. Again, though, the pattern appears beyond 
Washington. Reporters met with diplomats in various places 
I",, 
from the American E~bassy in La Paz to the Bolivian Embassy 
in Buenos Aires. 
Evidence concerning the executive branch supports 
Reston's contention that the pcess exercised little 
influence over the Eisenhower administration. The study 
found no example of the administration responding to an 
editorial and only one example of an. administration 
responding to a story -- the denial that Spruille Braden's 
charges only represented his own views. Hhgh-level 
administration sources were also uncommon except through 
public statements which did not involve a reporter-official 
relationship. 
Specifically, Reston said that Dwight Eisenhower was 
irritated by the press, and such a cool relationship 
between the administration and the press is confirmed ~here. 
The writings of administration officials and especially of 
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Milton Eisenhower suggest this coolness was based on their 
beliefs which overemphasized traditional press theory which 
calls on independent news organizations to produce citizens 
with an expert understanding of the problems and issues 
faced by the administration. Reston also sees extraordinary 
administration power in foreign policy as a reason for a 
lack of press influence, and the record does show that in 
1953 the administration initiated its aid program to 
Bolivia using existing legislation. However, a low level of 
coverage appears to have played a greater role in giving 
President Eisenhower a free hand than the administration's 
institutional position. 
Reston's thesis breaks down, however, in the area of 
press relations with Congress. They are virtually 
non-existent in connection with relations with Bolivia. 
Congressmen did not react to administration policies 
through the press, and they did not demonstrate a 
cooperative relationship with reporters even though they 
were involved to some extent in relations with Bolivia. 
~ 
,They did not make immoderate statements to the press to 
advance their public images as they might have in light of 
the fact that the MNR had reputed ties to enemies of the 
republic. It would be foolish to suggest that this 
indicates there is not a substantial level of contact 
between the press and the Congress. Reston and other 
writers clearly document that contact. The Bolivian 
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experience demonstrates, however, that the relationship is 
not a universal rule and suggests it becomes weak or 
non-existent in areas that do not receive major attention 
from the news media. 
N_:}ther does this study support Reston's undefended 
contention that the press can exercise influence in foreign 
policy via the academic community. Granted, academics 
exercised an influence on the administration, but there is 
little to suggest that they had any greater impact than 
other independent groups, say business leaders. Milton 
Eisenhower, of course, played a crucial role in the 
relationship with-Bolivia, but he was a special case 
because he was as much a public servant and a brother as he 
was an academic. Furthermore, he was not influenced much by 
the press. There is minimal evidence of interaction between 
academics and journalists. Columnist Adamantios T. 
Polyzoides, for example, moved in both circles, but that 
evidence is hardly sufficient to justify the special 
mention Reston gives to the academic connection. 
Sine~ thj/s study has focused on Res ton's thesis, it has 
examined primarily short-term avenues of direct influence. 
Nothing here, however, has ruled out long-term influence or 
influence that exerts itself through a mass audience. While 
it is unreasonable to assume, in the latter case, that ~e 
press produces citizens expert on all public issues, there 
is a strong case for some form of influence since leaders 
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in the United States are accountable to voters who are ~ 
• 
heavily exposed to the mass media. On the other count, 
long-term avenues might provide addi.tion means of 
journalists exercising influence on foreign policy, perhaps 
through academics, for instance. A Bolivian case study 
would probably not be suitable for testing such avenues, 
however, since the level of coverage was low, making it 
impossibly difficult to trace the results of long-term and 
indi:ect influence. 
All in all, the Bolivian case study supports Reston's 
feeling that press influence on fnreign policy was low in 
the decades leading up to 1966. The Eisenhower 
administration acted -- and acted responsibly -- relatively 
~ free of public or congressional pressure. In effect, it 
worked outside the spotlight of the popular press. As 
Walter Lippmann observed in Public Opinion, "Men cannot do 
the work of the world by this light alone.• 
___ ; 
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